Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Cluster Shiftable Loads Consumotion Clean Energy

With the promotion of global energy decarbonization and my country’s "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality",vigorously developing a new power system dominated by clean and low-carbon wind power generation and solar photovoltaic power generation has become an inevitable trend of energy transformation.With the access of a high proportion of clean energy,the lack of regulation capacity has become an urgent problem to be solved in the new power system.In the context of the development and utilization of the regulation capacity on the power supply side,how to tap the huge and low-cost regulation capacity contained in the load side has become the key to solving the serious shortage of grid regulation capacity.In view of the large number of load-side regulation capabilities,the small scale of individuals,and the difficulty of direct dispatch due to individual behavior differences,combining the behavior characteristics of different load-side subjects to design incentive mechanisms and optimal incentive contracts that consider behavioral differences,stimulating the load-side to participate in grid regulation has become the current Difficulties and hot issues of research.Based on the research and summary of the existing research results of the incentive mechanism design of load side regulation capacity,this paper classifies and quantifies the behavior preferences of power users on the load side,and introduces the information asymmetry characteristics of interested parties into the incentive mechanism and the optimal incentive contract design,so as to make it more objective,accurate and scientific,so as to maximize the release of user side regulation capacity.It can also be more targeted to tap the adjustment ability of load side shift loads（SLs）users.Based on the above problems and assumptions,the author takes SLS power preference as the starting point,and divides SLS users into economic users（EUs）,standard users（SUs）and comfort users（CUs）according to the close relationship between their initiative to participate in demand response（DR）and their own comfort and economic preference.The balance of interests between load aggregator（LA）and SLs users and the impact of resource scarcity on the incentive mechanism are considered.Based on the principal-agent theory,various basic assumptions such as SLs users’ preference proportion,utility loss cost,economic output,incentive contract and random factors are established.The utility loss theory in economics is applied to quantify the participation cost of SLs users,construct the user participation in DR,and establish the optimal incentive mechanism model under two kinds of information,The expressions of the optimal incentive contract are obtained respectively.Matlab simulation results show that six factors,such as mining depth,incentive sequence,incentive intensity,retained income,resource scarcity and risk aversion,have an important impact on SLs users’ participation in DR on this basis,the optimal incentive scheduling strategy considering SLs users’ power consumption preferences（CUCP）is proposed above.In order to verify the implementation effect of the incentive mechanism,the optimal incentive contract and the optimal incentive strategy proposed in this paper,the author designs a sample of 30,000 households with electric heating users managed by a single LA based on practical problems in reality.The CUCP strategy is compared with the incentive scheduling strategy that does not consider the user’s electricity preference.The results show that under the same optimal incentive contract method,the CUCP strategy can significantly improve the satisfaction of SLs users participating in DR.In addition,in terms of economic benefits,the CUCP strategy can provide LA with a greater capacity for regulation,thereby obtaining more economic benefits.The validity and practicability of the incentive mechanism represented by the optimal incentive contract and the optimal incentive scheduling strategy are proved.Combined with the results of the calculation example,countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the government,new energy generators and LA dispatching SLs users to participate in DR,and it provides decision support for LA to stimulate the enthusiasm of SLs participation in actual operation.