Research On The Governance Structure And Optimization Of State-owned Holding Enterprises Under Mixed Ownership

At the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee,it was officially proposed for the first time to actively develop a mixed ownership economy as an important means of realizing the reform of state-owned enterprises.It is imperative to unswervingly carry out the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.Whether the corporate governance arrangements of mixed ownership enterprises are effective is crucial to the success of mixed ownership reform.According to the statistics of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,it can be seen from the data on property rights that as of the end of 2017,the central enterprises and sub-enterprises under the supervision of the SASAC accounted for 69%,and the proportion of provincial-owned state-owned enterprises in mixed ownership was 56%(1).With the deepening of the reform,the ratio has been further improved in the past two years.Therefore,this paper has certain practical significance as the research object of the current mixed ownership enterprise.Based on the theory of principal-agent theory,stakeholder theory,property rights theory and enterprise ownership theory,this paper takes a third-level nonpublic SD company affiliated to a central enterprise listed company as a case,and analyzes the current situation of the company’s corporate governance arrangements and its major problems in operation.And put forward some suggestions for improving the internal governance structure of the enterprise and the countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing the external governance environment.Based on the case data of SD company,the author conducted a detailed and indepth investigation and analysis of the governance structure of state-owned holding enterprises,and explored the different governance behaviors of state-owned shareholders and private shareholders under mixed ownership and the interests behind them.Targeted countermeasures and suggestions for specific problems existed,and provided some empirical evidence and reference for subsequent research and application.However,limited to the non-listed company governance mechanism,operation and related financial data is not mandatory to disclose,the amount of relevant data is not enough to conduct quantitative analysis based on large sample size of the same type of corporate governance data,so this paper uses case study to explore.At the same time,due to the limited material of the SD company party organization involved in corporate governance,this paper does not conduct indepth analysis and research on the role of party organizations in the corporate governance of state-owned mixed-ownership enterprises.This part is reserved for follow-up research.Through this research,the author finds that mixed ownership reform is an important means to improve corporate governance mechanism.In order to play its important role,it is necessary to combine different types of well-designed equity structure and internal governance mechanism to enable different ownership capitals to learn from each other.Thereby achieving the reform effect of "1+1>2".On the other hand,since the reform of mixed ownership is a systematic and complicated project,optimizing the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in this context requires not only the design of internal governance structure based on enterprise requirements,but also the need for the government and relevant departments to create good The external governance environment provides the necessary external conditions for mixed ownership enterprises.