Research On New Energy Vehicle Industry Investment Guidance Mechanism Optimized To Industry Chain Under Incomplete Market

In recent years,with the vigorous support of the country and the efforts of all parties in the society,China’s new energy vehicle industry has developed rapidly,gradually forming a basic pattern led by large enterprises and independent allocation of production factors by key enterprises.The overall industrial chain has taken shape.However,behind the scale expansion,some problems in the development of the new energy vehicle industry chain gradually revealed,mainly manifested in two aspects.On the one hand,the development of various links in the industry chain is uneven,which manifested by insufficient innovation in upstream basic technology links and some key components are still subject to people and downstream infrastructure construction is lagging behind.On the other hand,the distribution and development of various industrial chain links among regions lack coordination,and the problems of industrial isomorphism and repeated construction between regions are more serious.These are largely due to the fact that local governments are independent and the central government is weak in unified regulation,which leads to the lack of long-term goals for enterprises and local governments under non-complete market conditions,and weak profit-seeking behavior.Therefore,with the goal of optimizing the development of the industrial chain,under the control of the central government and the coordination of the local governments,it is necessary to actively guide enterprises to make reasonable investments in various regions.This article first explains the new energy vehicle industry chain optimization investment model,and analyzes the industry chain optimization investment model to promote regional industrial evolution.On this basis,this paper builds an investment-led multi-level equilibrium game model for industry chain optimization,and discusses the corresponding equilibrium mechanism.This equilibrium mechanism provides ideas for guiding the investment behavior of enterprises,promoting the rational distribution of China’s new energy vehicle industry chain in various regions,and using the advantages of various regions to improve the overall quality of industrial development.First of all,it makes an in-depth analysis of the current status and dilemma of investment in the new energy vehicle industry.In general,the new energy vehicle industry was stimulated by government subsidy policies,and industrial investment once showed explosive growth.The amount of industrial investment increased sharply,which led to rapid expansion of industrial scale.However,the new energy vehicle industry also faces problems such as an unbalanced industrial investment structure,low enthusiasm for interregional industrial cooperation,and poor integration of off-site investment and industrial networks.Secondly,according to the characteristics and attributes of enterprise investment,the enterprise investment model is divided into capacity expansion investment and industry chain optimization investment.On this basis,a regional industry scale-free network evolution model under different investment models of the enterprise is constructed and simulated analysis to explore the impact of differences in corporate investment models on industrial networks.The research shows that: Optimizing investment in the industrial chain can accelerate industrial agglomeration,and the knowledge growth of enterprises in the network has greatly increased,which is conducive to knowledge creation and sharing among enterprises.In addition,under the dual factors of environmental uncertainty and strong government dominance of resource endowments,companies tend to choose industrial chains to optimize investment.Thirdly,a multi-level equilibrium game model for the investment guidance of the new energy automobile industry oriented to the optimization of the industrial chain was constructed.First,the central-local commission-agent model was constructed,so that the localities strengthened inter-regional cooperation based on the requirements of the central government on the overall industrial chain layout,encouraged cross-regional investment of enterprises,and actively promoted the optimization of inter-regional industrial chain.Secondly,the three-party evolutionary game model of capital outflow government-capital inflow government-invested enterprises is constructed,and the balance of interests in the process of promoting the optimization of enterprise industrial chain is analyzed.Then,the key factors that affect the evolution of the three parties to equilibrium state are identified through simulation.Research shows that the key factors which promote the evolution of the three-way equilibrium point include the central government’s incentives and profit distribution coefficients,local distribution coefficients for excess profits,corporate environmental regulatory costs,and additional costs.Finally,on the basis of the above research,combining theory and practice,it is proposed that enterprises actively choose the guiding strategy policy of industry chain optimization investment.The government strengthens the direction of industrial investment by improving the industrial investment policy system.The government integrates effective industry resources by building inter-regional investment cooperation platforms.By encouraging enterprises to diversify their cooperation and investment model innovations,and accelerating industrial network integration,etc.,it provides guidance for the government.