The Mechanism And Influence Mechanism Of Insider Control In Private Listed Companies

With the continuous improvement of the socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics and the continuous optimization of the industrial structure,private listed companies have become an important pillar of the national economy.They have generated strong power for economic growth,created a large number of jobs,and also become the main source of social science and technology innovation.Private listed companies are the cornerstone of high-quality development of the national economy.At present,private listed companies generally realize the separation of management right and ownership,and form the corporate governance mode of separation and balance.However,due to the deepening of the level of corporate governance specialization,the decentralization of ownership structure and information asymmetry,the actual power of listed companies is often more in the hands of executives.Executives have the characteristics of "economic man",whose primary purpose is to pursue the maximization of their own interests.Once small and medium-sized shareholders are difficult to form an effective supervision of managers,it is likely to cause the problem of insider control.In many private listed companies,the rate of executive pay rise is far faster than the growth of corporate performance,and even the situation of "hanging upside down".In order to meet the requirements of the salary system,some managers ignore the long-term development of the company and seriously damage the interests of shareholders.The problem of insider control questions the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism.In the case that the owner of a company can not exercise effective supervision,can we rely on the good moral cultivation of operators to supervise their own behavior? Insider control problem is the conflict of interests between shareholders and operators due to the mismatch of residual claim and residual control,which is essentially the corruption caused by the failure of corporate governance.At present,the relevant research on insider control problem in China is mostly focused on large state-owned enterprises,and there are few cases for private listed companies.This paper selects Meiyan Jixiang,a listed company in A-share hydropower industry,as the research object,measures the degree of internal control of Meiyan Jixiang through the model formula,analyzes the operation and development of the company from the perspective of internal control,and further analyzes the impact of internal control on corporate governance,aiming to solve the following practical problems: first,how to make private listed companies get rid of internal control Secondly,how to protect the self-interest of small and medium-sized shareholders in the case of internal control problems;thirdly,how to optimize the corporate governance of private listed companies in order to prevent internal control problems.