Research On Urban Rail Transit Project Operation Service Quality Promotion Incentive

With the transformation of urbanization from the pursuit of speed to high-quality development,China ’ s urban public transport has great potential for development.The modern transportation mode represented by rail transit is changing the urban spatial economic pattern and people ’ s lifestyle.At the same time,people ’ s demand and expectation for urban rail transit are also deepening,and more and higher requirements are put forward for the service level of urban rail transit.The rapid growth of the scale of the network and the rising daily passenger traffic make the operation and management difficulty and maintenance pressure increase rapidly.At present,most of the urban rail transit projects with high public welfare attribute need government subsidies to achieve continuous operation,and enterprises lack the driving force to further improve the quality of operation and service.The operation subsidy of urban rail transit projects is based on the principal-agent relationship,and a reasonable incentive mechanism is set to promote the high quality development of urban rail transit service.It has important practical significance for optimizing the service level of urban rail transit,coordinating the cooperation between the government and rail transit enterprises,and promoting the gradual integration of urban rail transit and urban development.Firstly,this paper expounds the characteristics of urban rail transit,and classifies urban rail transit services from the perspective of facilities and management.Combined with the report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the outline of traffic power construction and the basic national conditions of China ’s aging population,the demand for service quality improvement is analyzed from the perspective of times,government and passengers.Secondly,the incentive model of service quality improvement of urban rail transit enterprises without considering reputation,the incentive model of reputation only considering passengers ’ impression and the incentive model of dual reputation are constructed in turn.The operation data of Fuzhou Metro are used to compare and analyze the difference between the two models on the service quality effort of urban rail transit enterprises.Then,according to the operation and management mode of urban rail transit in China,considering the influence of dual reputation incentive,the dynamic differential game model of government and enterprises is constructed from the perspective of long-term development.Finally,based on the above results,this paper systematically puts forward strategies and suggestions to promote the sustainable development of urban rail transit from the aspects of phased evaluation,deepening differentiated services,encouraging enterprise innovation,and promoting the development of urban rail culture.The results show that : Firstly,the decision model and decentralized decision model can help the service quality of urban rail transit reach the optimal state.Second,the improvement of urban rail transit service quality will be affected by other unfavorable factors,but it will still return to a stable equilibrium state with the development of time.Third,the greater the influence coefficient of service reputation on passengers and service reputation on the government,the better the service quality of urban rail transit will be.The smaller the enterprise effort cost coefficient and the negative impact coefficient are,the more significant the service quality improvement effect of urban rail transit will be.However,the impact coefficient of service reputation on the government under the centralized decision-making mode has no significant effect on service quality.