Research On The Control Contest Of Meiyan Jixiang,the Listed Company Without Actual Controller

In recent years,with the development of the domestic capital market,the shareholding structure of listed companies has become more diversified,and a number of listed companies without actual controllers have gradually emerged.Control contests often happen in listed companies without actual controllers,and a considerable part of them are defended by the management who actually controls the company.What is the internal cause of the control contests of the listed companies without the actual controller,and how will the listed companies be affected after the control contests? This paper studies the insider control implemented by the management of listed companies without actual controllers.First,the paper reviewed related papers about the insider control and control power,and introduced the relevant theories of this article.On the basis of the principal-agent theory,the private benefit of control theory and the status of a-share listed companies without actual controller,the paper analyzed the formation mechanism of control contests of listed companies and the impact on listed companies on theoretical level,which determined a train of thought and laid a theoretical basis for the case analysis.Then this paper selected Guangdong Meiyan Jixiang Hydropower Co.,LTD as a case,analyzed some specific performance to determine whether there is insider control problem in the company.Then corresponding to the logic of the theoretical analysis above,this paper respectively analyzed the formation mechanism of Meiyan Jixiang’s control contest and its various effects on the listed company.The research shows that the contests for control of listed companies without actual controller essentially comes from the insider control of the company,and the contest for control does not effectively improve the level of corporate governance,but affects the stable development of the company,thus causing negative impacts on the company.In this regard,this paper puts forward four suggestions: first,to strengthen investor education and improve the voting mechanism of shareholders’ meeting;Second,improve the board system;Third,the construction of effective control market;Fourth,to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism.In order to reduce the occurrence of control contests and maintain the order of China’s capital market,author hopes to restrain the insider control and avoid the problem of insider control.