Research On Game-theoretic Based Optimal Operation Technongy For Regional Integrated Energy Systems

The regional integrated energy system can reduce carbon dioxide emissions and improve energy utilization while ensuring users’ energy consumption.It is an effective way to achieve the goal of “to peak carbon dioxide emissions and achieve carbon neutrality”.The reform of the energy market has made the demand side’s position in the energy market gradually rise,and it has become possible for load aggregators and users to influence the market as participants.As a demand-side management method applied to the regional integrated energy system,integrated demand response can effectively alleviate the supply pressure on the regional integrated energy system caused by the gradual increase in user energy consumption demand.Therefore,studying the integrated demand response characteristics and game behavior of users and aggregators in the context of developing electricity markets has important theoretical significance and research value.The main contents of this dissertation are as follows:1)The key factors that affect users’ participation in integrated demand response projects are analyzed,and the characteristics of regional integrated demand response are summarized.Through literature summary and research,the key factors that affect users’ participation in integrated demand response projects are studied from the three aspects of market mechanism design,policy guidelines,and users’ load characteristics.Laying the foundation for subsequent users to participate in integrated demand response projects related research by summarizing and refining the energy consumption behavior characteristics of typical user types,qualitatively analyzing the integrated demand response potential of different types of users.2)According to the key factors extracted,with residential users as the research object,an evolutionary game model in which residential users participate in integrated demand response under the guidance of aggregators is constructed.Considering the characteristics of incomplete rationality and strong randomness in residential users’ actual decision-making,a market incentive mechanism based on evolutionary game is established to analyze the proportional evolution process of users participating under different price stimulus policies in a certain period of time.The symmetric evolutionary game model and the asymmetric evolutionary game model are established respectively without considering the difference in user energy consumption behavior and considering the difference in user energy consumption behavior.With two sets of simulations,six evolution result curves for residential users under the three price policies provided by the aggregator are given,which verifies the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed model.3)A two-layer game optimization model of the regional integrated energy system considering the integrated demand response is established.A multi-park integrated energy system architecture including aggregators,users,integrated energy systems and energy interconnection networks is constructed.In order to achieve a win-win situation for aggregators and users,based on the establishment of a lower-level user energy consumption control cost model and an upper-level aggregator operation control model,a two-layer game optimization model including non-cooperative game between lower-level users and upper-level cooperative game between aggregators is constructed.Through two scenarios of fixed heating price and time-of-use heating price,combined with simulation data,the proposed two-layer game optimization model of the multi-regional integrated energy system is verified.The research results of this dissertation can provide a certain reference for the aggregator to formulate the comprehensive demand response project incentive mechanism and the game optimization problem between the aggregator and the user.