Research On Demand Response Incentive Model Of Load Aggregator In New Power System

The proposal of the carbon emission peak and carbon neutralization goal and the construction of the new power system have accelerated the process of China’s clean and lowcarbon energy transformation.Due to the intermittency and volatility of renewable energy output,the integration of large-scale renewable energy,mainly wind and solar,during the transformation process has put forward higher requirements for the flexibility of new power systems.As a flexible demand side management mode,demand response is not only an important way to alleviate the power gap,but also a normalized means to regulate power supply and demand.However,due to technical and policy constraints,the current demand response projects implemented in China are mainly aimed at large industrial and commercial users,and it is difficult for various small and medium-sized users to directly participate in demand response due to load dispersion and size constraints.With the deepening of power market reform,emerging market entities represented by load aggregators can directly participate in power market transactions.Load aggregators can integrate small and decentralized loads into largescale controllable loads,thus providing opportunities for small and medium-sized users to participate in demand response.In the market environment,power grid companies,load aggregators,end users and other market entities put forward higher requirements for the strategy selection and benefit distribution of demand response based on their different needs and goals.For this reason,this paper takes the main load aggregators in emerging markets as the research entry point,analyzes the interaction mechanism between grid companies,load aggregators and end users in the process of demand response,and comprehensively considers the impact of user response willingness on load aggregators’ participation in demand response in response to the demands of different market players in the new power system,A set of incentive model for load aggregators to participate in demand response considering three party interaction is designed to encourage load aggregators and their agents to participate in response,so as to optimize resource allocation and promote the safe,economic and stable operation of power system.Specifically,the research work of this article is as follows:Firstly,the interaction mechanism between load aggregators,grid companies and end users in the process of demand response is analyzed.As a bridge between power grid companies and end users,load aggregators can integrate the load of end users and form a large-scale controllable load to participate in the interaction with power grid companies.In this interaction process,complex and intense interaction games are formed between load aggregators,power grid companies,and end users.The analysis of the interaction mechanism of load aggregators’participation in demand response paves the way for the construction of the subsequent game model.Secondly,based on loss aversion and emission reduction awareness,analyze the response willingness of multiple end users,accurately depict the response willingness of different categories of users,and reflect the differences of multiple end users.Incorporate loss aversion and emission reduction awareness into the cost-benefit analysis of end users,and construct a load aggregator end user Stackelberg game model considering psychological factors.Thirdly,based on the research results of the interaction game between load aggregators and end users,the interaction game between power grid companies and load aggregators is introduced,and the interaction between the two sides is expanded to a tripartite interaction.A Stackelberg game model considering the tripartite interaction between power grid companies,load aggregators,and end users is established.The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution of the model game are proved by backward induction,and a distributed heuristic method is proposed to solve the model.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed three party interactive Stackelberg game model and solution method is verified through the analysis of a numerical example.Through setting up different scenarios to compare and analyze the impact of the response willingness of end users on the decision-making and income of all parties,and give relevant suggestions to encourage load aggregators to participate in demand response from the government,society,power grid companies and load aggregators.The results indicate that psychological factors have a significant impact on the willingness of end users to respond.Without considering the impact of loss aversion and emission reduction awareness on end users,it can increase the aggregate response volume of load aggregators by 12.42%,and increase the revenue of power grid companies by 23.87%.Compared to emission reduction awareness,loss aversion has a more prominent impact on the willingness of end users to respond,and is the main psychological factor affecting their willingness to respond.The results of the example analysis provide a reference for load aggregators to participate in the incentive model design of demand response.