Research On "Tunneling" Behavior Of ~*ST Shengda’s Controlling Shareholders And Its Influence

With the rapid development of China’s economy,people’s income has increased significantly and their financial management awareness has been enhanced.More and more small and medium-sized investors have participated in the securities market,which has also promoted the improvement and development of China’s securities market.However,with the rapid development,there are also many problems to be solved,the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders or controlling shareholders is one of the problems.In 2002,the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges conducted a census of the listed companies in the market at that time,and found that more than half of them were occupied by capital of major shareholders.In 2003,in view of the phenomenon of fund holding by major shareholders,China securities regulatory commission and SASAC also issued the notice to force the issuance of audit notes on fund holding.In April 2005,the government and regulatory authorities carried out the reform of non-tradable shares,and introduced a series of measures to curb the encroachment of interests by major shareholders.In spite of this.the behavior of major shareholders or controlling shareholders hollowing out listed companies still happens regularly.Therefore,the research on the "tunneling" behavior of*ST Shengda’s controlling shareholders is of referential significance for preventing the tunneling behavior of major shareholders or controlling shareholders of similar listed companies.Firstly,this paper introduces the market norms of SME board enterprises and related policies and punishment forms that may be involved in the "tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders,and expounds the ways and means that controlling shareholders may adopt to carry out the "tunneling" behavior.After that,the cases of capital occupation and illegal guarantee of the two main means of "tunneling" in 2018,as well as the punishment subjects and the punishment results were summarized and analyzed by means of information inquiry and manual sorting.It was found that the punishment for "tunneling"of major shareholders in Shanghai and Shenzhen was relatively strict,but the legal supervision is relatively lacking.In the object of punishment,the probability of directors being punished is the highest,while the probability of independent directors is the lowest.Then,taking*ST Shengda as a case,this paper gives a specific account of*ST Shengda’s corporate background,development history,main shareholders and shareholding structure,controlling shareholders,actual controllers and the changes of board members.Three methods of "tunneling" behavior of*ST Shengda controlling shareholder are introduced.According to the related announcement and the background of the industry,the reasons and influence of the "tunneling" behavior of the controlling shareholder are discussed in detail.At the same time,some countermeasures and Suggestions are given to prevent the behavior of "tunneling".By analyzing the case of "tunneling" behavior of*ST Shengda’s controlling shareholders,it is found that the main means of "tunneling" are direct capital occupation,illegal guarantee and repayment of loans for major shareholders.The causes of "tunneling" are divided into external causes and internal causes.External causes include external supervision and imperfect corporate system development.And the internal reasons are the failure of controlling shareholders’ absolute control and transfer control,the poor operating performance of listed companies,the failure of major restructuring and internal control defects.And controlling shareholder’s behavior of "tunneling" also caused huge influence undoubtedly.First of all,for the enterprise itself,it affects the normal business activities of the enterprise,reduces the profitability of the enterprise,and also causes the turnover of enterprise executives and employees.Secondly,for investors,the decline in profitability of listed companies has reduced dividend distribution,and the market value of listed companies has shrunk,which has also severely damaged investors’ investment confidence.Finally,for the capital market,the irregularities of listed companies have damaged the credibility of the market,which is not conducive to the improvement and development of the capital market.In view of this phenomenon,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to improve corporate governance structure,strengthen information disclosure requirements,strengthen supervision and punishment,strengthen investor education,and safeguard investors’ rights and interests.So as to curb the controlling shareholders’ behavior of "tunneling",protect the legitimate rights and interests of the majority of investors,and maintain the fair operation of the capital market.