A Study On The Anti-monopoly Of Standard Essential Patents Denial

According to the regulations on Prohibition of abusing intellectual property rights to exclude and restrict competition issued by the former State Administration for Industry and commerce,standard necessary patent refers to the patent necessary for the implementation of a certain standard.The inclusion of patented technology in the standards is in line with the objective requirements of the development level of science and technology of the times,and is also conducive to the maximization of the interests of patent holders.With the increasing status of information and communication technology and other industries in enterprise competition and national competition year by year,the role of standard essential patents in technological progress and innovation and development has gradually expanded.In practice,there have been many cases involving standard essential patents,among which Huawei v.IDC,Qualcomm abuse of market dominance and so on are more influential cases in China.Based on this,both theory and practice call for legal regulation of standard essential patents,so as to make our country more powerful and advantageous in international competition.At present,the academic research on standard essential patents has basically formed a complete and logical system,including the abuse of market dominant position of standard essential patents,injunctive relief,patent hijacking and reverse hijacking,licensing fees and concentration of business operators,etc.,but as the most obvious and influential anti-monopoly behavior of standard essential patents,there are still gaps in the research on refusal of licensing Insufficient.Refusal to license is the embodiment of refusal to trade in the field of intellectual property in the antimonopoly law.According to the general principles of autonomy and freedom of competition in private law,the market subject has the right to choose the opposite side of the trade freely and refuse to trade with anyone.According to the general principles of the intellectual property law,the patentee is protected by the "legal monopoly" system,and the patentee takes the patent right publicity as the principle Conditions,in exchange for its exclusive rights and interests in the market.But just like the refusal of the tangible property,the refusal of the patentee’s license will have the effect of harming the competition under special circumstances,especially the standard necessary patent formed after being included in the standard.The patentee naturally has a larger market power,and its refusal of the license may have a greater lock-in effect and network effect,thus leading to the market entry barrier And the market blockade,endangers the normal and orderly market competition,and thus violates the relevant provisions of the competition law.It should be regulated by the anti-monopoly law that the patentees abuse the dominant market position to refuse the license.In view of the value of theoretical and practical research,this paper will use the combination of theory and cases to study the anti-monopoly regulation of standard essential patent denial.The main body of the article is divided into four parts:the first chapter is the overview of the standard essential patent denial,which describes the general concept of the standard essential patent denial,the reasons for anti-monopoly regulation and the theoretical basis of the standard essential patent denial regulation.The second chapter is the analysis of the current situation and problems of the anti-monopoly regulation of the standard essential patent denial in China.By summarizing the current situation of the legislation and law enforcement of the standard essential patent denial in China,we find out the existing problems in the application of the anti-monopoly law to regulate the standard essential patent denial in China.The third chapter is about the practice of standard essential patent refusal and Its Enlightenment to our country.It aims to introduce the practice of standard essential patent refusal in the United States and the European Union,and find out their excellent practical experience for our country.The last chapter is the focus of this paper,that is,the suggestions for improving the anti-monopoly regulation of standard essential patent refusal in China.Based on the summary of the first three chapters,the author will make specific suggestions on the anti-monopoly regulation of standard essential patent refusal in China from two aspects:the selection of legislative system and the construction of examination method system.Based on the content of anti-monopoly law and intellectual property law involved in the refusal of licensing of standard essential patent,the article adopts the method of legal analysis,comparative analysis and empirical analysis in the process of writing.The author intends to put forward his own opinions for the anti-monopoly research of refusal of licensing of standard essential patent in China,which is oriented to solve practical problems.