Research On Labor Protection, Salary Incentives And Enterprise Risk Taking

Facing the economic environment full of challenges and opportunities,rational selection of high-risk and high-yield investment projects is an important condition for enterprises to seize development opportunities and gain competitive advantage.Obtaining profit by taking risks is a basic logic of business management,and risk-taking is also a comprehensive indicator to measure the future development of the company.With the development of economy and society,the concept of people-oriented has continuously penetrated into all aspects of society.Human capital is an important asset.Whether it is macroeconomic development or micro-enterprise value creation,human capital plays an irreplaceable role as a key link.In order to give full play to the great utility of manpower,countries have introduced corresponding laws and regulations to protect the rights and interests of laborers.China officially implemented the new Labor Contract Law in 2008.The introduction of a series of strict rules and regulations has greatly improved the level of labor protection in China.However,while the new labor law effectively protects the vital interests of employees,it also brings a series of influences to the employers.Therefore,it is a theoretical and practical issue to explore whether labor protection affects the company's risk-taking by affecting the human capital of the enterprise.Based on principal-agent theory and tournament theory,protection of lazy effect and fairness effect,this paper takes Chinese listed companies as research samples from2001 to 2018,selects the implementation of new labor law in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment,and adopts the method of double difference model construction.The paper discusses the effect and influence path of labor protection on the risk-taking of laborintensive enterprises,and verifies the adjustment effect of the salary incentives of executives and employees.In addition,the effect of labor protection on risk-taking is different in property rights.The research on the differences in enterprises with different governance levels has been carried out.The research in this paper finds that,first of all,with the increase of labor protection,the level of risk-taking of labor-intensive enterprises has decreased.Secondly,the negative impact of this negative influence on the shareholding of senior executives,the small internal compensation gap of executives,The difference in executives-employee pay gap,lower executive pay and higher wages for ordinary employees is more obvious.In the end,this negative impact is different among enterprises with different property rights and different corporate governance levels,in private enterprises and the adverse effects of companies with poor corporate governance are more significant.The research in this paper shows that although labor protection strengthens the protection of employees' interests,it is not conducive to incentives,which has a negative impact on the company's risk-taking.Therefore,enterprises need to protect the interests of employees,supplemented by other incentives or strengthen internal and external corporate governance to resist the adverse effects of labor protection.This article not only supplements relevant research,but also has certain policy implications.