Research On Competition Law Regulation Of "choose One" Behavior Of E-commerce Platforms

With the development of the Internet economy,competition among major network platforms has intensified.In order to gain user resources and continuously obtain platform traffic,many platform operators are constantly innovating their own business models while also continuously implementing various improper competitive behaviors.From the earlier "Qihoo 360 v.Tencent abuse of market dominance" case,to the later "Jingdong v.Tmall" case,"Glanz v.Tmall" case,and the fierce "either-or" behavior of Meituan and Didi in the takeaway market,etc.Around the highly controversial "either-or" behaviors in the field of e-commerce,suspected of unfair competition and suspected monopoly behavior has aroused widespread concern in the academic,judicial and ordinary people.For e-commerce platforms to force merchants to "choose one from two",merchants can choose to apply them through civil and commercial laws such as the Contract Law and the Tort Liability Law,but such traditional civil and commercial laws focus on the principles of free trade,equality and voluntariness,etc.At the same time,most of the merchants in the platform have a natural dependence on the upstream e-commerce platform,and can only be forced to sacrifice lawsuits with the e-commerce platform in exchange for a long-term survival opportunity in the Internet platform.Has been further condoned,which in the long run has undermined substantial fairness and justice and disrupted market competition order.China's "Anti-Unfair Competition Law" and "Anti-Monopoly Law" have many regulatory provisions for the "either-or" behavior of e-commerce platforms.At the same time,with the promulgation of the "E-commerce Law",to a certain extent,this law has filled the legal gap in the field of e-commerce in China's Internet economy.It seems that there is a law to follow,but due to the insufficient regulation of the internal provisions of the competition law and the controversy of the relevant provisions of the "E-commerce Law",it has caused a certain impact on China's competition law system,in fact causing "unable to rely on " situation.Therefore,the original intention of this article is to analyze the various problems of the specific regulation of the "either-or" behavior of the e-commerce platform in China's competition law system,to enrich and improve China's competition law,and to integrate the "E-commerce Law" with China's competition law system.Chapter 1 consists of three parts.The first part analyzes the phenomenon of "either-or" behavior,observes decades of "either-or" behaviors changes,summarizes several typical forms of "either-or" behaviors,and then summarizes the specifics from these performance forms.The second part is an analysis of the legal nature of the "either-or" behavior,using a combination of case analysis,law and economics analysis,and the bilateral characteristics of the Internet platform to explore whether the behavior is reasonable from multiple angles,and observe the current status of the legal regulation of "either-or" behavior from the three levels of legislation,justice and law enforcement in China.The third part puts forward several problems in China's regulation of e-commerce platforms about "either-or" behavior.Chapters 2 and 3 are the core chapters of this article.The second chapter analyzes the regulation of "either-or" behavior in China's "Anti-Unfair Competition Law",which mainly has two parts.The first part takes China 's newly revised “Anti-Unfair Competition Law” Article 12 as the main entry point,from the generation and application of the law,and comprehensive analysis based on relevant cases.The second part takes Article 2 of the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law" as the starting point and combines relevant cases to make a rational analysis of whether the "either-or" behavior applies the principled clauses,and finally comes to the regulation of the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law" is inadequate.Chapter 3 analyzes the regulation of "either-or" behavior in China's " Anti-Monopoly Law ".The essence of "either-or" behavior is defined as "exclusive dealing".According to the two expressions of exclusive dealing,the first one is that the market-dominant operator implements the behavior of restricting transactions;the second one is that it has an upstream or restrictions on vertical unrestricted price agreements reached by counterparties in downstream relationships.Regarding the first case,Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law is applied for regulation.Firstly,it is necessary to define the relevant market,secondly determine whether it has a dominant market position,and finally,comprehensively determine whether it abuses the dominant market position.Regarding the second case,the provisions of Article 14(3)of the Anti-Monopoly Law were applied for regulation,and it was concluded that the "Anti-Monopoly Law" was unable to regulate the "either-or" behavior.Chapter 4 puts forward specific regulatory suggestions on the "either-or" behavior of China's competition regulations.Because the application of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the Anti-Monopoly Law are not applicable or appropriate,the regulation is in trouble.At this time,the system of abuse of comparative advantage can be introduced.From the origin and characteristics of the system,it is more suitable to the system of China's "Anti-Unfair Competition Law".In addition,with the promulgation of the 2019 E-Commerce Law,the competition clauses related to the regulation of the "either-or" behavior of e-commerce platforms are controversial.Combing and advising the provisions so that they can be fully integrated with China's competition law system,and truly achieve effective regulation of the "either-or" behaviors of e-commerce platforms.