A Study On Administrative Monopoly In Centralized Drug Procurement

The reform of the medical system has always been one of the most concerned livelihood issues in our country.In order to achieve the purpose of reducing drug prices,local governments were actively exploring new models of drug purchasing.High drug prices and corruption in the field of pharmaceutical purchases and sales have led to drug purchasing in a centralized manner.Centralized purchasing has received attention and promotion due to its excellent ability to control prices.The establishment of centralized drug procurement could consolidate the strong bargaining power of medical institutions on the upstream and downstream sides to the centralized drug procurement platform,which helped to separate the interests between medicines.Shanghai,Shenzhen and other places have taken the lead in piloting the Group Purchasing Organizations(GPO).So far,many provinces and municipalities have begun the procurement model of centralized drug purchasing.Centralized purchasing has continuously presented a regionalized and joint practice.It is foreseeable that centralized drug purchasing is the general trend of future drug procurement.However,in the process of carrying out the centralized drug purchasing,Shenzhen and Shanghai’s plans were investigated by antitrust regulation agencies for suspected monopolies,which reflected from the side that China’s exploration of the centralized drug purchasing was not smooth.This article systematically studies and analyzes the current state and reasons for the promotion of centralized drug purchasing in China,the administrative monopoly issues that arise,and the regulatory recommendations for administrative monopoly under the centralized purchasing model.The entire article starts from the surface problems,delves into the reasons behind the problems,and combines theoretical analysis to come up with regulatory recommendations with a view to providing legal advice in the future regulatory process of centralized drug purchasing.Problems in the field of drug procurement are related to the national economy and people’s livelihood,as well as the future direction of the country’s medical reform.In view of its particularity,this article cuts through the administrative monopoly issues arising from centralized drug purchasing,integrates research methods such as comparative research method,case analysis method,and literature research method to expand the performance of various types of administrative monopoly problems under the centralized drug purchasing model.In order to provide legal advice for the implementation of centralized drug purchasing.The first chapter of this article summarizes and summarizes the cases of the centralized drug purchasing model that is currently being explored,and studies the characteristics and operating models of the most representative Shenzhen GPO,Shanghai GPO and other provincial government centralized purchasing.Based on the analysis of the current practice,what role did administrative played in the platform’s access and what administrative monopoly related issues would arise.At the same time,it also demonstrates the market dominance and comparative market advantage of the centralized drug purchasing platform.Therefore,starting from the definition of the relevant market and the structure of the platform economy,the analysis is combined with the actual situation.The second chapter analyzes the administrative monopoly of the centralized drug procurement platform by administrative agencies under the centralized drug procurement model.First,this chapter interprets the current regulations on centralized drug procurement,explain the administrative background under the platform,analyzes and explores the underlying reasons behind it,and thus leads to the market dominance of the centralized drug procurement platform supported by administrative forces.Second,from a practical point of view,it summarizes the specific manifestations of the current administrative agencies’ monopoly on the centralized drug procurement platform,such as the platform’s access and possible market-dividing behaviors on the platforms.Third,based on the above analysis,it is proposed that the introduction of government documents and the implementation of policies should be subject to fair competition review to evaluate the possible effects and consequences of possible policies on the drug procurement market.Moreover,it puts forward a new system construction for the positioning and supervision of the future platform development,and starts from the further promotion of the diversified marketization of the platform.The third chapter undertakes the administrative monopoly actions that may be carried out on drug manufacturing enterprises by the centralized drug procurement platform as an organization exercising public authority.First,it analyzes the legal relationship that may arise between administrative agencies and pharmaceutical manufacturers in the process of centralized drug purchase transactions.Second,the analysis platform uses its own administrative background and market advantages to monopolize drug manufacturers,including restrictions on drug manufacturers’ access,low-priced purchases,and other unreasonable transaction conditions.Third,based on the discussion of the above-mentioned behaviors and in combination with China’s current legal initiation,it proposes the regulation of monopolistic conduct on centralized drug procurement.The fourth chapter is also the administrative monopoly behavior that may be carried out on the drug purchaser by the centralized drug procurement platform as an organization exercising public authority.First,it analyzes the legal relationship between the centralized drug procurement platform and the drug purchaser.Secondly,based on the case,the monopoly behaviors of the platform,such as restrictions on access and restricted transactions,on the drug purchaser by using administrative power and market dominance are discussed.Thirdly,in combination with the existing legal provisions,a solution to the monopoly resolution is proposed.