Investor Protection Studies Under The Registration System

Information disclosure is the core and soul of China's registration system and it also an important way to protect the legitimate interests of investors.How to strengthen and improve investor protection centered on information disclosure under the registration system is an important theoretical and practical issue that needs to be solved urgently.For this reason,this thesis by analysis the evidences of the securities and futures commission and the Shanghai stock exchange information disclosure violations in recent years,reveal the issues of registered under the system of information disclosure of false statements,illegal guarantee and Unture professional reports,and theoretical analysis on these problems,and carry out theoretical analysis on the above-mentioned problems,and put forward corresponding solutions and countermeasures.Besides the preface,this thesis is divided into three parts.The first part firstly sorts out and analyzes the punishment decisions on information disclosure violations issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission and Shanghai Stock Exchange in recent years,and finds that the problem of information disclosure violations is prominent in China.Violations are mainly related to listed companies' financial fraud,illegal guarantee,related transactions,failure to disclose major information,and inaccurate professional reports issued by intermediary agencies.Most of the targets of punishment are the controlling shareholders and actual controllers,the information disclosure agents of listed companies represented by directors,supervisors and senior executives,the intermediary institutions and the project leaders.The second part attempts to analyze the causes of information disclosure system and the legitimate obligations of listed companies and Intermediary agencies to disclose complete and true information to investors through information asymmetry and principal-agent theory.Therefore,the value of the information disclosure system based on solving the problem of information asymmetry and the imbalance of interests existing in the principal-agent system is bound to be oriented by the information demand of investors.However,the value orientation of information disclosure should not only be elaborated in theory,but also a series of measures should be formulated to regulate the occurrence of illegal behaviors in information disclosure.From the perspective of the motivation of the information disclosure obligor,it is found that the information disclosure irregularities of listed companies and intermediaries are linked with interests.On the one hand,the information disclosure of listed companies is self-interested;on the other hand,the professional reports issued by intermediaries are inaccurate and conflict with the interests of the listed companies they employed.Therefore,the new Securities Law of China has special chapters for information disclosure,which stipulates information disclosure in various aspects before and after the event,puts forward new obligations and responsibilities for the information disclosure of listed companies and intermediaries,and strengthens the punishment for illegal behaviors.However,there is still room for improvement in specific implementation,corporate management culture and the degree of recognition for directors,supervisors and senior executives.The third part proposes specific ways to improve the information disclosure system from the three aspects of strengthening supervision by regulatory agencies,improving the quality of information disclosure by listed companies,and diligence and due diligence of intermediaries,in order to improve the level of information disclosure in the securities market and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors.