Technology Of Chip Security Monitoring Based On Physical Field Information

As the production model of chips increasingly relies on outsourcing manufacturing,hardware Trojan may be implanted in all stages of its production.Hardware Trojans are the most effective means of chip attacks and have attracted widespread attention.Hardware Trojans can cause changes in the physical field information.Therefore,in the field of chip security,the real-time monitoring technology of hardware Trojan based on temperature field effects and the precise repairing technology of hardware Trojan based on temperature field characteristics are studied.In addition,a security vulnerability analysis caused by the voltage drop characteristics of Field Programmable Gate Array(FPGA)is also carried out.The main contents are as follows:(1)A real-time monitoring technology of hardware Trojan based on temperature field effect is realized.For chip security,a real-time monitoring method for hardware Trojan is proposed in this thesis.Firstly,the influence of hardware Trojan activation on the temperature field effect is introduced.Next,the structure and principle of the temperature sensor is analyzed,and on this basis,a sensor network layout method based on the Ring Oscillator(RO)is proposed.Then,the Kalman filter algorithm and residual autocorrelation are introduced to predict and track the temperature characteristics in real time,and determine whether there is a hardware Trojan in the chip,so as to clarify the security status of the chip.The results show that the correct rate of each Trojan circuit in the experiment is above 98%,and the missed alarm rate is as low as 0%.In addition,the influence of parameters such as the number of sensors,chip technology,and threshold step size on the monitoring results is also discussed.(2)The precise repairing technology of hardware Trojan based on temperature field characteristics is realized.In view of the monitoring of Trojan activation during the chip operation phase,a precise repairing method is proposed.First of all,the principle of positioning and repairing against Trojan is analyzed.Next,combined with the standard process of reconfigurable design,the layout of the temperature sensor is elaborated.Then,the positioning of Trojan based on the sum of square deviations is proposed to determine their working area.Finally,a partial reconfiguration method is introduced to dynamically refresh the Trojan’s work area,thereby repairing the Trojan’s state.According to the experimental results,the positioning accuracy of each Trojan circuit reached 96% and above,and the Trojan with the correct positioning will surely be reset successfully.In addition,the influence of parameters such as the number of sensors and the location of the Trojan on the effect of positioning is also discussed.(3)The vulnerability of FPGA based on voltage drop characteristics is studied.For FPGA chips,the voltage failure problem is studied.First of all,the voltage drop characteristic of FPGA is analyzed in detail.On this basis,using the principle that a large number of ring oscillators work at the same time will bring an excessive voltage drop,a threat circuit is designed to pose a security threat to the FPGA.Finally,the threat circuit was used to verify on FPGA.The results show that the threat circuit designed in this thesis can cause voltage failure to FPGA and place it in a denial of service state.In addition,this thesis also discusses in detail the parameters such as the different numbers,operating frequencies,and orders of RO.