Research On Game Behavior Of Electricity Retailers Under Conditional Value-at-Risk And Multi-purchase Strategies

With the further deepening of China’s electric power system reform,the degree of marketization of the electricity sales side continues to deepen,the entities in the retail electricity market present a complex interactive relationship,which brings new challenges to the operation of electricity retailers.As an emerging market entity,electricity retailers must not only face the uncertainty of electricity purchase price and consumer side load demand but also bear the risk of market share fluctuations caused by competition with other market entities.Therefore,in the competitive market environment,it is of great significance to consider risk factors and various electricity purchase strategies to conduct research on the game behavior of electricity retailers and explore the operating laws of the retail electricity market.This paper constructs a multi-retailer game model from the perspective of the electricity sales side,explores the interaction among the entities in the retail electricity market,and studies the game behavior of the electricity retailer.Firstly,this paper summarizes the electricity purchase and sale transaction mechanism in China’s retail electricity market and the operating mode of electricity retailers,analyzes the risk sources of electricity retailers in the process of electricity purchase and sale,uses Monte Carlo simulation and backward reduction technique to generate uncertain electricity price scenarios,and then introduces conditional value at risk(CVaR)to assess the risks of electricity retailers.Secondly,the retail electricity market is abstracted as a multi-agent system including electricity retailers and electricity consumers,in which the electricity retailers are encapsulated as agents with independent optimization decisions,and each agent includes four types of strategies:bilateral contract electricity purchase,centralized competitive trading electricity purchase,spot market electricity purchase,and retail price;Electricity customers are considered as a whole,and the interaction between electricity retailers and electricity customers is indirectly described through the Logit discrete choice model in which different price sensitivity coefficients are used to represent the customer loyalty to different retailers.Finally,simulation cases are designed to simulate and analyze the laws and characteristics of the game behavior of the electricity retailer from three aspects:risk preference,customer loyalty,and different electricity price scenarios on the power purchasing side,and the following laws are derived:1)The higher the risk aversion level of electricity retailers,the more likely they are to establish higher retail electricity prices and tend to purchase electricity from medium and long-term markets with less price fluctuation.2)When the bilateral electricity price is the highest,the retailer with lower risk aversion will obtain higher expected profits,and the expected profits of electricity retailers will decrease as their competitors’ risk aversion decreases.3)the electricity retailer invests in service costs to obtain higher customer loyalty,which can improve the retailer’s expected profit and market share under certain conditions,but there is obvious marginal utility and even inflection points.4)When the bilateral electricity price is the highest,if the electricity retailer increases the proportion of electricity purchased from bilateral contracts,the retailer will bear less risk,but the cost of electricity purchase will rise,leading to higher retail electricity prices.5)In different electricity purchase side price scenarios,there are significant differences in the equilibrium strategies of electricity retailers,electricity retailers should select appropriate electricity purchase and sales decisions based on the actual market situation.