Research On Multi-airport System Management Mode And Airline Network Selection Strategy Based On Game Theory

During the period of “the 14th Five-Year Plan”,the construction of China’s civil aviation has entered a new stage of high-quality development,and the public has higher requirements for the convenience,safety,diversification,and quality of air services,therefore,the domestic aviation market has been further activated.China has issued many policy documents such as the National Civil Transport Airport Layout Plan and the Action Plan for the Construction of a Strong Civil Aviation Nation in the New Era,focusing on promoting the development of world-class multi-airport systems in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,the Yangtze River Delta,the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area,and the Chengdu-Chongqing.To build world-class multi-airport systems,China’s civil aviation has entered a new stage of integrated development with multi-airport systems as the core,which marks the gradual transformation of the civil aviation system from the “1.0 era” where a single airport was the main focus to the “2.0era” where multi-airport systems are the decision-making unit,with more emphasis on high-quality synergistic development.However,due to a lack of integrated planning and coordination,the rapid development of multi-airport systems has been accompanied by increasingly prominent structural conflicts,with a series of problems such as unclear positioning of airports and uneven resource allocation.The route subsidy of the multi-airport system has also led to disorderly competition for regional aviation resources,exacerbating the problem of airline network homogeneity.To address the many contradictions in the integrated development process of multi-airport systems in China,this thesis analyses the multi-airport system management mode and airline network selection based on a game theory approach.The main research contents include:Firstly,the game model between the government,airports,and carriers is constructed with the multi-airport system as the basic decision-making unit.By analyzing the airport profit,airline revenue,high-speed rail revenue,and consumer surplus under the air-rail and direct airline network,the game is solved by using the inverse induction method to compare the changes in total social welfare of the multiairport system under the group management and the local management.The results show that group management is a Nash equilibrium strategy that can maximize social welfare and is consistent with the public welfare orientation of China’s civil aviation airports.Secondly,to explore the impact of different subsidies on the airline network of multi-airport systems,a dynamic game model is constructed regarding the sub-airports,airlines,and passengers.It is found that: when the total operating cost of air-rail cooperation is less than one,airlines will choose a point-to-point network under each sub-airport adopts a low subsidy strategy,while two airports compete for subsidies and adopt a high subsidy strategy,airlines will choose a hub-and-spoke network and let the large airport as the hub;when the total operating cost of air-rail cooperation is greater than one,airlines will choose a point-to-point network under each sub-airport adopts a low subsidy strategy,while when two airports are competing for subsidies and adopt a high subsidy strategy,airlines will choose a hub-and-spoke network with the smaller airport as the hub.Thirdly,considering that the subsidy of airports for airlines is a long-term,complex,and dynamic game process.To further explore the evolutionary path of airline network selection under different subsidies,an evolutionary game model consisting of subairports and airlines is constructed.The results show that the evolutionarily stable strategy of sub-airports is a low-subsidy strategy,and airlines may evolve into a huband-spoke network or a point-to-point network,while from the perspective of total social welfare,airlines eventually tend to choose a hub-and-spoke network.Sensitivity analysis reveals that expected subsidies and route fixed costs have a significant impact on the strategic stability of airlines,but not on the strategic stability of airports.Finally,based on the above study,relevant strategic recommendations are given to provide a basis for multi-airport system management authorities to scientifically select multi-airport system management modes,and determine subsidy policies and airline networks.