Research On The Evolution Of Cooperation Behavior Based On Different Evolutionary Rules On Complex Networks

In nature and human society,cooperative behavior is everywhere.How to explain why cooperative behavior exists among biological populations and how to promote cooperation has always been a hot issue in academic research.Taking evolutionary game theory on complex networks as the theoretical framework,starting from how individuals choose learning objects,this thesis puts forward the following two novel evolutionary rules,and uses Monte Carlo method to explore the impact of the two mechanisms on cooperative evolution through computer simulation experiments.This thesis introduces a trust-driven updating rule based on reputation into prisoner’s dilemma games on ER random networks and BA scale-free networks and investigate the effects of this model on cooperation.To control the influence of reputation in the system,this thesis introduce a heterogeneity parameter to describe the effect of reputation on trust.The results show that when individuals update their policy through this trust-driven updating rule,the level of cooperation is significantly promoted.The increase in the heterogeneity parameter will promote the level of cooperation.Besides,this thesis study the effect of the correlation between the node degree and reputation heterogeneity on cooperation due to the different influences of individuals.Additionally,this thesis investigates the robustness of the model in real social networks and conduct experiments on the dolphin and karate networks,respectively,finding that the qualitative features of the results are unchanged.This thesis proposes a preferential selection mechanism based on payoff satisfaction and memory in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma games.People might prefer to learn from those with higher satisfaction in real life.Therefore,they are usually more preferable to choose individuals with higher satisfaction when selecting learning role model.However,the expectation of defectors and cooperators may be different obviously in the real society.And in general,the expectation of the defector is higher than that of the cooperator.This thesis introduces an expected payoff to describe the level of individual satisfaction and memory length to represent the memory capacity of the individual.This thesis investigates the effects of expected payoffs and memory length on cooperation.The results show that cooperation could be promoted when individuals prefer to choose more satisfied neighbors.And the size of expected payoffs and memory length also has different effects on the evolutionary game process.Besides,this thesis investigates the robustness of the network topology,and find that the qualitative features of the results are unchanged.