Research On Tax And Subsidy Mechanism Of New Energy Vehicles Based On Evolutionary Game Model

In order to deal with global climate change,our country has put forward the goal of "double carbon".Transportation is the third largest source of carbon emissions in our country,of which motor vehicle carbon emissions in the absolute majority of transport carbon emissions,is the focus of emission reduction.The development of fuel-efficient new energy vehicles is not only an effective means to implement the goal of "double carbon" construction,but also a strong grasp of the country’s ecological civilization.As the main body of new energy automobile consumption,consumers play a vital role in the process of promoting new energy automobile.Based on the evolutionary game model,this paper explores the optimal tax and subsidy policies suitable for the promotion of new energy vehicles.Based on the government perspective,this paper studies how the government should implement tax and subsidy policies in order to promote new energy vehicles more effectively.In theory,the two-party evolutionary game model based on government and consumer is first constructed,and the evolutionary equilibrium point of the evolutionary model is explored by replicative dynamics analysis.In terms of expansion,the replication dynamic equation is derived mainly according to the game payment matrix and the expected return function.Then the local equilibrium point is obtained from the dynamic equation.Finally,according to Friedman method,the stability of each equilibrium point is analyzed by Jacoby matrix.According to the stability analysis,the evolution of static tax and static subsidy policy can not reach the equilibrium point automatically,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy.When introducing dynamic tax and static subsidy,static tax and dynamic subsidy,dynamic tax and dynamic subsidy,evolution can be balanced.Analyzing the equilibrium point,we find that the probability of the government choosing to implement the support policy is negatively related to the subsidy cap,the tax cap,the probability of consumers choosing to buy new energy vehicles is negatively related to the cost of implementation,the subsidy cap is negatively related to the tax cap.Secondly,on the basis of the theoretical analysis above,the simulation analysis based on MATLAB is carried out.Through the simulation analysis of the comparison of the three dynamic support policies,we can find that the combination of static tax and dynamic subsidy policy is the best,followed by dynamic tax and dynamic subsidy policy,and dynamic tax and static subsidy is the worst.After determining that static tax and dynamic subsidy are the optimal support policies,numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of government implementation policy cost,tax value,subsidy value and new energy vehicle utility on the evolutionary game.The simulation results show that the high cost of policy implementation will reduce the willingness of the government to implement supportive policies and consumers to buy new energy vehicles.Too high subsidies will lead to less willingness of the government to implement supportive policies and consumers to buy new energy vehicles,while too low taxes will reduce consumers’ willingness to buy new energy vehicles.With the improvement of the effectiveness of consumers in purchasing new energy vehicles,the willingness of the government to choose to implement supportive policies will continue to decrease.Thirdly,based on the model of two-party evolutionary game between government and consumers,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among government,enterprises and consumers.Through simulation analysis,it is found that the best way is for the government to implement static tax dynamic subsidies to consumers and dynamic subsidies to enterprises.The difference is that the third party also requires the implementation of dynamic subsidy policy,indicating that the government should also implement dynamic subsidy policy when considering subsidizing other related subjects of new energy vehicles.In the end,the paper constructs a relevant measurement model based on the evolutionary game model.Through empirical analysis,it is found that the subsidised downhill slope and the acquisition tax rate increase can effectively improve the penetration rate of new energy vehicles.The higher the number of charging piles per capita,the higher the fiscal expenditure of local governments in the field of transportation,and the greater the population density,the higher the penetration of new energy vehicles.In summary,this paper puts forward the following policy suggestions: First,dynamic adjustment of new energy vehicle promotion policy;The second is to extend the tax exemption for new energy vehicles Third,to effectively reduce the cost of policy implementation;Fourth,consumers should continue to optimize their experience of buying new energy vehicles.