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Study On Subsidy Strategy Of Rural Renewable Energy Based On Evolving Game Theory

Posted on:2020-10-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W B ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2370330572475732Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Vigorously developing renewable energy has become an important orientation of policy for transformations of energy and green development in various countries,which is of great significance for implementing sustainable energy development strategy and achieving harmonious development between humanity and nature.In October 2017,the 19 th national congress of the communist party of China(CPC)put forward the strategy of revitalizing rural areas,which aimed at accelerating the transformation of rural development momentum and providing an excellent opportunity to explore a new path for the development of rural renewable energy.Encouraged by government subsidies,China's rural renewable energy construction projects are growing rapidly.However,due to advances in technology,down the cost of renewable energy has been pushed down,which forces the decline in government subsidies.On the other hand,there is a large gap in the level of economic development between different rural areas in China,and the construction of information infrastructure is weak.As a result,the intensity and effect of renewable energy subsidies in rural areas are greatly different in different rural areas.It has become an important task for the current government to explore the internal mechanism that leads to the difference of rural renewable energy subsidies,optimize the incentive effect of subsidy policies,and then guide the orderly development of rural renewable energy.The research on the subsidy strategy of rural renewable energy mainly includes two parts: one is the strategy of subsidy's intensity,the other is the strategy of subsidy's signal transmission.Theories used in the paper include about evolutionary game theory,neighbors of game theory and evolutionary game theory.We respectively discuss the evolutionary path of the government's subsidy in the long term,and the dynamic process of signal transmission,which is analyzed based on assumptions of reasonable subsidies and under different rural social structure.What's more,other factors affecting policy of renewable energy subsidies has carried on the brief analysis.This paper expounds the reasons for the decline of rural renewable energy subsidies and puts forward some policy Suggestions for optimizing the rural renewable energy subsidy strategy and improving the subsidy effect in the future.The thesis mainly carries out two innovative works:(1)Based on evolutionary game theory,the paper discusses the game mechanism between strategies of government subsidy and farmers' renewable energy choice.Then,the short-term effects of economic development and the long-term effects of renewable energy-related technological progress are studied by simulation.The paper takes the DPV development in China as an example.The panel model is constructed with the provincial data in China,which find that the economic growth,the increase of government subsidies and the reduction of the cost of DPV has a significant promoting effect on the DPV development.(2)Through the neighbors' game,we prove that the government subsidy has a significant effect on farmers' investment in renewable energy.Nevertheless,due to the particularity of rural social structure,the information of subsidy policy cannot reach all farmers in time,thus affecting the actual effect of rural renewable energy subsidies.In order to solve this problem,this paper mainly starts from the rural social structure,respectively analyzes the mechanism of signal transmission under the simple network and under the complex network.Through the simulation analysis based on the R language,this paper mainly studies the influence of subsidy's intensity,rural scale,close relationship between farmers and network noise on the transmission process of government subsidy signal in the whole rural area.With high costs and inadequate subsidies in economically backward areas,farmers refuse to invest in renewable energy.With the economic development,the increase of government subsidies makes it advantageous for farmers to invest in renewable energy,and the development of renewable energy in rural areas accelerates.However,with the high investment cost of renewable energy,farmers just invest in renewable energy if the government provides subsidies.When the cost is low,the level of economic development has no impact on the long-term equilibrium of renewable energy.The more developed the economy is,the more possible it is to cancel the subsidy of renewable energy.The lower the cost of renewable energy,the more conducive it is to achieve the long-term balance of renewable energy.It is effective for promoting rural renewable energy to add the number of neighbors.Increasing government subsidies and reducing network noise also help accelerate the spread of renewable energy in rural areas,but will have little impact on the depth of the spread.Adjacent's probability and rural scale are two ways to increase the number of neighbors,which exert a positive influence on the speed and depth of rural renewable energy diffusion.The research results show that speeding up the construction of new rural areas and improving rural information infrastructure is conducive to improving the effect of rural renewable energy subsidies and realizing the comprehensive development of rural renewable energy.This paper provides a new framework of theoretical analysis for the development of rural renewable energy.We point out the optimization strategy to adjust rural renewable energy subsidy in the future,provides a basis and new ideas for improving the effect of subsidy's signal from the perspective of social structure.To sum up,this paper proposes the following Suggestions: firstly,implement differentiated renewable energy subsidy strategy based on local reality;Secondly,encourage technological innovation and reduce the investment cost of renewable energy.What's more,consummates the countryside information infrastructure and strengthens the information supervision and the feedback.Last but not least,speed up the construction of "new countryside" and promote rural population agglomeration.
Keywords/Search Tags:Evolutionary Game, Rural renewable energy, Subsidies, Information Conduction
PDF Full Text Request
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