Noncooperative-Cooperative Biform Game For Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing And Profit Distribution Under Deposit Return To The Recovery Party

In recent years,as the world economy developing rapidly and technology innovating quickly,the problems of resource waste and environmental degradation have appeared.How to realize sustainable development has become a major issue in the world.The severe situation has caused many scholars to pay attention to the closed-loop supply chain and think about the circular economy.Although many scholars have already focused on the importance of closed-loop supply chain in green production,and actively explored how closed-loop supply chain management should adapt to the contemporary economic environment.There are still some problems that cannot be ignored in the development of closed-loop supply chain,such as the lack of sufficient incentives for supply chain members,the double marginalization effect caused by considering only the maximization of their own interests,and the lack of in-depth research on closed-loop supply chains for complex competitive situations and structures.And deposit return systems have been widely used and studied as an efficient way to incentivize recycling.Consequently,the main research work and innovations in this thesis include:1.Propose a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model and its solution for a closed-loop supply chain with intra-chain competition for deposit return recyclers.To solve the problem of strategy optimization and profit distribution in a closed-loop supply chain with two manufacturers and one recycler,a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model for pricing and profit distribution is developed,and a solution method integrating the noncooperative game and the cooperative game is provided.This method first derives the coalition characteristic function for the cooperative part of the model based on Maximin theorem.Then,it uses the Shapley value to solve for the allocated profit in any competitive situation and transforms this allocation into the payment value for the noncooperative part of the model.Finally obtains the optimal pricing strategy and profit allocation through Nash equilibrium.After numerical analysis,it was found that deposits promote recycling and remanufacturing,but the governments also need to set deposits wisely.At the same time,corresponding insights are presented for competing manufacturers and recyclers.2.Develop and solve a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model for the interchain competitive closed-loop supply chain of deposit return recyclers.For two competitive closed-loop inter-chain supply chains,the cooperative and non-cooperative relationship between the two chains is analyzed,the pricing and profit distribution problems of the two competitive closed-loop supply chains are studied.Then a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model is created for the inter-chain competitive closed-loop supply chain with the deposit returned to the recycler,and corresponding solution method is proposed through integrating the Shapley value,Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg game.Simultaneously,the benefit maximization strategy and the distribution of cooperative profit are obtained.Finally,through numerical analysis,it is shown that a deposit return system is more effective in closed-loop supply chains with inter-chain competition for wholesale sales channels,but that too high a deposit can still be detrimental.In this thesis,the noncooperative-cooperative biform game is applied to closed-loop supply chain.A unified analytical model of pricing and profit allocation,which is applicable to closed-loop supply chains with intra-chain competition and inter-chain competition considering deposit return recyclers,is developed.It not only solves the closed-loop supply chain decision optimization and profit allocation problems,but also reduces the double marginalization effect and enables the closed-loop supply chain to be coordinated.Meanwhile,competitive closed-loop supply chains containing platform are considered to adapt to the complex economic environment of the modern era.And then,management insights are provided for closed-loop supply chains in two competitive situations.It is significant for the management and development of closed-loop supply chains.