Research On Enterprise Eco-label Strategy Optimization Based On Multi-agent Interaction Behavio

Excessive greenhouse gas emissions and global warming are currently climate change issues of great concern to the international community,so China and Western developed countries have launched a roadmap of “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” in the process of actively pursuing the goal of carbon neutrality.As a powerful tool to encourage individuals to adjust their consumption patterns and promote the development of green consumption,the carbon-labeling Program benefits the environment by providing information on the carbon emissions of products and services and encouraging individuals to change their consumption behavior,and the overall planning of carbon-labeling policies is also accelerating accordingly.Firstly,considering customer sensitivity in the context of the implementation of carbonlabeling plan,this paper constructs a two-stage green supply chain Stackelberg game model of manufacturer-retailer under manufacturer-led structure,retailer-led and vertical structure.By solving the optimal solution of the model and performing numerical simulation,it is considered how customer behavior characteristics interact with the green innovation activities of the supply chain.The results show that when the government subsidizes manufacturers and customers,the retail price under different dominant structures is basically positively correlated with customers green preferences.When the government has a subsidy situation,whether it is subsidized to manufacturers or customers,the wholesale price is basically positively correlated with customers’ green sensitivity.There is a positive correlation between customers’ green preference and the level of green effort of enterprises,and the impact of customer preference on carbon-labeled enterprises is more obvious.Secondly,a tripartite evolutionary game model of enterprises,customers and governments is constructed,and the interactive behavior of carbon-labeled enterprises and customers under the active supervision of the government is discussed.There are three potential evolutionary stabilization strategies(ESS)in the game model,and the choice of each ESS depends mainly on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of stakeholders.The green R&D investment level of carbon-labeled enterprises has a positive impact on the implementation of carbonlabeling policies,while customers’ identification of carbon-labeled products may affect the business orientation of enterprises.Strict government supervision is an important guarantee for carbon-labeled enterprises and customers to adhere to green initiatives.Therefore,the findings not only illustrate effective methods and insights for the sustainable implementation of carbonlabeling policies with the participation of multiple stakeholders,but also suggest stronger incentives to improve regulatory regimes and market outcomes.Finally,TCL Group,the first TV manufacturer in China to obtain carbon-labeled certification,is taken as an example.