Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Supply Chain Enterprises’ Behavior And Policy Recommendations Under The Double Integral Policy

In recent years,under the double pressure of the global energy crisis and environmental pollution,new energy vehicles,as an energy-saving and environmentally friendly green vehicle,have aroused great concern in China,and have adopted a series of measures to promote the development of new energy vehicles and application.Although these measures have achieved certain results in the short term,the high amount of subsidies given to enterprises has caused the enterprises to rely on some,and even "fraud" has appeared.Therefore,the country decided to reduce the subsidies for new energy vehicles from 2016 onwards,and there will be no subsidies by 2020.In response to this problem,in order to establish a long-term mechanism for the development of new energy vehicles,and reduce the negative effect of the financial subsidies simultaneously,the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued the "double point policy" in September 2017,and it will be fully implemented in 2018.However,as far as the results of the current implementation are concerned,the effect is not particularly significant,There are some unpredictable problems in the entire automobile industry chain,such as the low production willingness of vehicle manufacturers in supply chain enterprises and the coldness of new energy point transactions.In fact,the effect of the double-point policy on promoting the development of the new energy vehicle industry depends mainly on the role of the government in it and the production decisions of automobile manufacturers in supply chain enterprises.Only when the government and automobile manufacturers can actively take actions to achieve energy saving and emission reduction and benefit from the double-point policy,the optimization of the production behavior of automobile manufacturers and the development of the new energy vehicle industry can be best promoted by the policy effect.Therefore,explore the game relationship between the participants of the double integral policy,identify the key factors that affect the behavior of the subjects,provide strategic suggestions for government adjustments,perfect policies,and production decisions for vehicle manufacturers,and then promote the development of new energy vehicles to achieve Energy saving and emission reduction have strong practical guiding significance.Based on this background,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the decision-making behavior of the government and vehicle manufacturers under the double integral policy.The main research contents are as follows: First,introduce the research background and research significance of this article,sort out the relevant theories,overview and literature of the new energy automobile industry related policies,low-carbon economics and evolutionary game theory.Secondly,it analyzes the interest relationship between the government and the vehicle manufacturers.Based on the theory of evolutionary game theory,it proposes the basic assumptions of the evolutionary game between the government and the vehicle manufacturers,and then builds the revenue function and replicates the dynamic equations.Then,the model is analyzed using the revenue function and the copying dynamic equation,and the differential solution is used to obtain the evolutionary game stabilization strategy of the government and vehicle manufacturers under the double integral policy,and the parameters in the model are discussed using MATLAB simulation to identify the impact The key factors of the decision-making behavior of the two parties finally obtained the results of the evolutionary game between the two parties,and from this two aspects of government policy optimization and vehicle manufacturers’ production behavior optimization in the supply chain enterprise to further promote the double-point policy for the development of new energy vehicles Influence to make corresponding strategy suggestions.Through the above analysis,the research results show that: 1)The behavioral evolutionary game results of the vehicle manufacturers and the government under the double integral policy(produce new energy vehicles,maintain the integral channel)strategy,which can maximize the benefits of both parties.2)The additional costs incurred by vehicle manufacturers to produce new energy vehicles,the revenue from the sale of NEV points,the costs incurred in the purchase of NEV points,the government’s punishment for vehicle manufacturers not to produce new energy vehicles,and the closing of the point channel The extra income obtained later is a key factor that affects the decision-making behavior of both parties.Therefore,while the government continues to strengthen the promotion and promotion of new energy vehicles,it should increase the punishment for manufacturers who do not produce new energy vehicles;at present,it should continue to maintain the point channel and refine the point price into the double point policy,And properly control the number of points.vehicle manufacturers should establish a long-term vision,see the tangible and intangible benefits brought by points trading,and seize opportunities;focus on the research and development of core technologies,strengthen cooperation and exchanges between enterprises;timely adjust the industrial structure,and actively deploy new energy Automobile production line,thereby reducing production costs.