Research On Benefit Distribution Mechanism Of Urban Renewal Project Based On Evolutionary Game

As one of the effective ways to optimize urban spatial structure and improve the overall image of cities,urban renewal plays a crucial role in revitalizing inefficient urban spaces,boosting regional economic growth and enhancing residents’sense of well-being and satisfaction.However,the implementation of urban renewal projects involves many stakeholders,such as local governments,urban renewal project developers and urban renewal project residents,and the interests of these stakeholders vary greatly,which can easily lead to conflicts of interest and hinder the implementation of urban renewal projects.Therefore,how to build a scientific mechanism for benefit allocation in urban renewal projects and how to reach a reasonable benefit allocation relationship among stakeholders is the key to satisfy the interests of all parties,resolve their conflicts of interest and promote the smooth implementation of urban renewal projects together.Based on this,this research investigates the benefit distribution relationship among stakeholders in the implementation of urban renewal projects from the perspective of benefit distribution,and constructs a three-party dynamic evolutionary game model among local government,urban renewal project developer,and urban renewal project site residents.By analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points of the evolutionary game,it is found that there are two pure strategic equilibrium points（ESS）of the evolutionary game,E₇（0,1,1）and E₈（1,1,1）,which correspond to the government-led and market-led urban renewal models,respectively.By referring to the example data to assign values to the simulation parameters and using Matlab to analyze the strategy evolution trajectory of each stakeholder group under the change of different values of benefit allocation parameters,it is found that when the subsidy coefficient is 0.2,all three stakeholder groups can make an evolutionary stable strategy in the shortest time,and when the sharing coefficient is 0.8,government departments,urban renewal project developers,urban renewal project The residents of the urban renewal project site have the shortest time to reach a stable evolutionary game strategy,and the residents of the urban renewal project site may adopt an opposing strategy when the discount coefficient is lower than 0.8.By analyzing the relationship of interest distribution among various stakeholder groups in urban renewal projects,relevant suggestions are made from four perspectives:financial subsidies,urban renewal project costs,incremental revenue distribution,and economic compensation.Through this research,the study on the interest allocation mechanism of three stakeholder groups in urban renewal projects is intended to provide some theoretical reference for the formulation of a scientific and reasonable urban renewal interest allocation mechanism,and further promote a more scientific and efficient implementation of urban renewal projects.