Research On Earnings Management Behavior Under Performance Commitment

Since the performance commitment was applied in China in the early 21st century,its basic development law has been relatively clear.The original intention was to use the binding force of the contract to avoid the inherent risks caused by information asymmetry,stabilize the market,and safeguard the basic rights and interests of all participants in the restructuring activities.With the deepening of practice,many problems,to the target intention to raise the consideration and the collusion as the main reason,the "high premium performance commitment" phenomenon,"high premium performance commitment" commitment on the surplus management on the road,even financial fraud,and "commitment","promise accurate standard then face" phenomenon also appear.In this paper,combing the performance commitment and surplus management related previous literature,understand the relevant theory,expand the perspective of the research performance commitment and surplus management,research the means,characteristics and economic consequences,and reflect on why such problems exist and even worse,has been no breakthrough effective solution,from the perspective of external regulatory forces about what aspects is not in place,to solve this phenomenon should be treated and further measures.This paper selects the Yellow River cyclone mergers and acquisitions this distinct and representative case as the entrance,the horizontal and vertical analysis,analyze the case"accurate performance commitment" and "performance commitment" behind the promise may practice surplus management means,analysis of behavior characteristics and from the merger and acquisition and small and medium investors to explore the economic consequences,in order to from the main merger and the perspective of small and medium investors need to pay attention to the performance commitment,summarizes the scientific and practical targeted Suggestions.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)the performance commitment and compensation pressures are the main motivation for the surplus management behavior,the insufficient financial control and supervision guidance of the surplus management under the performance commitments;(2)the real earnings management and the receivable surplus management are used,to adjust the earnings;(3)the surplus management may achieve shortterm performance commitments but seriously against the interests of the principal and small investors in the long run.After analysis and research,this paper summarizes the practical and feasible suggestions for the principal,small and medium investors and external regulatory forces,hoping to improve the high quality completion rate of China’s performance commitment,make scientific use of the performance commitment,manage the surplus management behavior under the performance commitment,and help enterprises to better restructure.