Research On The Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Decision Making Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns Under Government Subsidies By Luyi Jing

Since the beginning of the 21 st century,the world has entered a new stage of rapid economic growth,but this stage has brought a heavy price to the natural world.The polar glaciers have melted,resources have been over-exploited,and human beings are facing increasingly prominent environmental problems.Governments of various countries have gradually realized the seriousness of the problem.After many studies and discussions,sustainable development strategies have become an international consensus.Among them,green supply chain management is an important measure in the sustainable development strategy.Under the effective guidance of the Chinese government,enterprises actively implement green supply chain management,reduce the impact on the environment in the production process and improve the green quality level of products by developing and applying innovative technologies and introducing energy-saving and environmental protection equipment.At the same time,with the development of e-commerce,sales channels have changed from a single traditional retail channel to dual online channels.Among them,the platform model is a major network dual-channel structure.In the dual-channel game,the decision-makers of supply chain enterprises are not absolutely rational,and they will also pay attention to the fairness of benefit distribution in commercial transactions.When corporate decision makers at the disadvantaged end feel that the distribution of benefits is unfair,they will boycott each other,so as to expect fairness,that is,fairness concerns.Based on the above background,this paper builds a dual-channel green supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer with an online consignment channel and a retailer with an offline sales channel.Using game theory and optimization theory,it first considers government subsidies to produce green.Manufacturers of products focus on the impact of government subsidies on optimal supply chain strategies and profits.Second,based on the previous chapter,the retailer’s reasonable anxiety behavior factor is presented,and the manufacturer establishes a game model that is not considered and considered,respectively,and analyzes different models of decision-making and performance of the distribution network,focusing on the perspective of the follower’s unilateral aspect focus and distribution focus.Finally,an agreement was established between the manufacturer and the traditional retailer to coordinate the supply chain.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)Under the government subsidy model,the total profit and product greenness under centralized decision-making are always greater than those under decentralized decision-making.Whether decentralized or centralized decision-making,increasing government subsidies can promote the total profit of the supply chain,the greenness of products and the increase in demand from various channels;the increase in the green production cost coefficient of products will lead to the total profit of the supply chain,the greenness of products and the demand of each channel decreases;the total profit of the supply chain gradually decreases with the increase of the commission ratio;the profit of each enterprise in the supply chain and the greenness of the products are affected by the green sensitivity of consumers.(2)When the retailer’s fairness concern behavior is not concerned by the manufacturer,the increase in the level of fairness concern will lead to a decrease in the profits of all companies in the supply chain,but the wholesale price,online sales price,and product greenness are not affected by this factor;The increase will also lead to a decrease in the demand for offline products,but the offline sales price and the demand for online products will also increase.When the retailer’s fairness concern behavior is concerned by the manufacturer,the increase in the level of fairness concern will lead to a decrease in the manufacturer’s profit,but it will help the retailer to obtain more profits;the increase of this factor will also lead to wholesale prices,product greenness,Online sales prices and offline product demand decline,but offline sales prices will rise accordingly;when government subsidies are small,online demand is positively correlated with this factor;while government subsidies are relatively large In the case of,online demand is negatively correlated with this factor.Whether or not the retailer’s fairness concern behavior is concerned by the manufacturer,an increase in fairness concern always leads to a decrease in total supply chain profits.(3)The improved revenue sharing contract can coordinate the dual-channel green supply chain when the parameters meet certain conditions,reduce the conflict between channels,and optimize the allocation of various resource elements in the supply chain,which has certain practical value.