Dynamic Game Of Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Power Structure Under Government Incentives And Altruistic Preference

Green and low-carbon development have become global trends,and achieving this goal has been widely recognized by the international community.Promoting ecological civilization and achieving common prosperity also need to follow this trend.In the new development stage,in order to build a new development model and achieve high-quality development,we must firmly move towards the path of ecological priority and low-carbon green development and fully implement the new development concept.Under the strategic policy of going for sustainable development,carbon emission reduction technology innovation is very necessary.Based on this background,in order to motivate enterprises to carry out carbon emission reduction innovation,this paper studies a two-level supply chain game strategy consisting of suppliers and manufacturers based on government incentives.The model takes the stock of carbon emission reduction technologies as the state variable,constructs dynamic optimization models for the no-government-incentive model,the governmentincentive supplier model,and the government-incentive manufacturer model,and deeply investigates the influence of different powers among firms on the equilibrium solution of the supply chain.Altruistic preferences are also introduced in the low-carbon supply chain for analysis.The model is solved using a differential game approach,and sensitivity analysis is performed on each parameter to determine their impact on the results.This paper mainly analyzes the model solution,conducts numerical calculations on Matlab,and draws the following conclusions:(1)The size of government incentive coefficients will affect whether enterprises are willing to carry out carbon emission reduction technology innovation and will have an impact on the profits of supply chain members,and the government should choose the incentive target reasonably.(2)The optimal trajectory of carbon emission reduction technology stock always increases first and then reaches the steady state,but this steady state level is affected by the preference for altruistic behavior.The optimal value with government incentives is higher than the optimal value without government incentives.(3)Different government incentives will lead to different power structures for each firm in the supply chain to maximize the total profit of the supply chain.This paper enriches the research on differential game in carbon emission reduction technology innovation regarding the game among low carbon supply chain members.In multiple game situations,low carbon supply chain members can make scientific business decisions,and the government can implement reasonable incentives.The research findings have certain reference value for the government and enterprises.