Trading Of Power Generation Rights Considering The Cooperative Game Between Captive PowerPlants And Wind Power Before The Quota

Driven by energy changes,large-scale wind power is connected to the grid,and the random nature of its generation makes system peaking a serious challenge.Among various flexibility resources,coal power is the most economical and reliable peaking resource,however,the base load allocated by the "three-public" dispatch and the large number of self-provided power plants hedge the system base load and squeeze the peaking space,resulting in a serious shortage of peaking capacity under the system,making a large amount of abandoned wind during the heating season.To alleviate this situation,many domestic provinces and cities have carried out mediumand long-term,centralized aggregated power generation rights trading for thermal power units and new energy sources,which has eased the peaking pressure to a certain extent.At present,the installed capacity of captive power plants accounts for more than 13%of thermal power plants nationwide,and they generally have overcapacity,high energy consumption,and substandard environmental protection.If power generation rights trading can be used to make them downsize or shut down during wind abandonment hours,it will not only reduce carbon emissions but also become a potentially huge peaking resource.To this end,this paper proposes a method of power generation rights trading between captive power plants and wind farms for a few days ago.The main research elements are as follows.First.the peaking market mechanism,the current status of research on thermal power generation rights trading and the participation of captive power plants in market trading are introduced,followed by a comparative analysis of the differences between domestic scholars on the benefit composition of thermal power units and captive power plants’ generation rights trading,and an overview of the current status of the application of cooperative games in power systems,so as to clarify the design ideas of this paper.Secondly,from the theoretical basis of the cooperative game,the cooperative game relationship between captive power plants and wind power is demonstrated by comparing the cost/benefit changes of each subject before and after power generation rights trading,analyzing the strategy space of the cooperative game between them,and constructing the game strategy space model of both sides.Then.based on the implementation effect of power trading,the equivalent peaking compensation mechanism is proposed,and on this basis,the cooperative game model considering the benefits of equivalent peaking,carbon emission and quota of captive power plants is constructed,and the improved Shapley value method allocation taking into account the green contribution,cost contribution and equivalent peaking contribution coefficient,based on the implementation of carbon quota and renewable energy consumption(quota system)policies.model.The generalized analytic programming method and the segmented linearization method are used to transform the model into a mixed integer linear model.Finally,the IEEE-30 nodal standard system is used for simulation analysis.The actual example shows that the cooperative game model proposed in this paper can improve the economic efficiency of captive power plants and wind farms,and effectively relieve the serious peaking pressure on the power system,and analyze the impact of coal and carbon trading prices and peaking compensation coefficients on the coalition revenue.The research results can provide a reference for the captive power plants with high survival pressure during the transition period of the power market.