Study On Asymmetric Power Pattern Of Fish Supply Chain And Its Collaborative Governance

China has established itself as the largest exporter of aquatic products worldwide,with leading figures in total aquatic production,aquaculture production,fishery population,and other indicators.However,the reliance on traditional fishery production methods to generate profit has resulted in low value-added fishery products and a significant loss of fishery talent.Such circumstances indicate that the traditional model of fishery development that prioritizes quantity is no longer practical.Additionally,the "small fishermen,big market" discrepancy between supply and demand,coupled with an unreasonable distribution pattern,has impeded the quality development of the fishery economy and led to meager income for fishermen.The support of the agricultural supply chain represents a viable option for enhancing fishermen’s income and promoting the development of the fishery industry.The agricultural supply chain,centered on agricultural products,links upstream,midstream,and downstream members of agriculture to establish a relatively high degree of organization.However,the existing agricultural supply chain often encroaches on the interests of small farmers,who are vulnerable and reap fewer benefits,thereby jeopardizing the safety of the aquatic products supply chain and impeding the progress of the aquatic industry.This paper aims to explore the factors,mechanisms,and core pathways that influence the asymmetric power and irrational distribution pattern of the aquatic supply chain based on collaborative governance theory,resource dependence theory,structural hole theory,and capturing theory.The paper utilizes game theory’s Stackelberg model,Nash model,Shapley-A-T value,and other mathematical models for argumentation and conducts a comparative analysis of their values using mathematical software.Field research is conducted on three distinct fish supply chains in Zunyi City,Guizhou Province,specifically the running ecological fish supply chain,common grass carp supply chain,and rice paddy fish supply chain.The results show that unbalanced dependence on resources,structural hole location,and environmental capture are the key factors affecting the irrational distribution pattern of fish supply chains.Members with strong resource scarcity and few potential substitutes and replacements for resources generate unbalanced dependence among members,resulting in an imbalance of power and a higher proportion of revenue for the dominant member.Environmental captivity leads to different decisions based on the member’s cost-benefit situation,where members with higher cost-benefit make captive decisions,and the remaining members must accept their decisions.Captive members will continuously improve the environment,enhance their resource scarcity,reduce their dependence on other members,gain power within the supply chain,and receive greater benefits."Resource-Dependence-Power," "Location-Resource-Power," and "Environment-Captive-Power" are the three core paths that influence the distribution of power and benefits in the supply chain.The asymmetric power and irrational revenue distribution pattern of "the strongest is stronger" and "the Matthew effect" disproportionately affect small-scale fishermen’s profits.To address these issues,this paper proposes a collaborative governance model that balances resource dependence and limits the distribution of revenue through four types of collaborative governance mechanisms:value coordination mechanism,optimal structure mechanism,risk-sharing mechanism,and supervision and control mechanism.These mechanisms provide a useful reference for solving the asymmetric power and unreasonable distribution pattern of the aquatic products supply chain...