Is Hume’s Moral Theory Moral Relativism?

The focus of this paper is on the question of why Hume,as an philosopher of Sentimentalism,did not move towards moral relativism in his theory of morality.In Hume’s idea,the theoretical foundation of morality is not based on reason,which is usually considered to be more stable.Instead,Hume chose the more difficult path of limiting reason and establishing a universal basis for emotion.This leads to the charge of slipping into moral relativism or nihilism.The argument in this paper attempts to mark the fact that the failure to reach absolute universals does not necessarily lead to a slide into relativism.Moral relativism,while denying universal moral standards,does not deny moral truths or realities.Hume is one of the representative figures of skepticism and the possibility exists of denying moral truth or the reality,so we need first to explore and qualify the scope of Hume’s skepticism.Hume became epistemologically skeptical while limiting the role of reason through his denial of the idea of cause and effect and of material entities,spiritual entities and God.Hume similarly limits the role of reason in morality,grounding it in moral sense rather than reason.But Hume’s moral theory is based on sympathy,with reason as a factual preparation for sense.So Hume is epistemological skepticism,not skepticism in the realm of morality.We clarify whether Hume’s moral theory is moral relativism by classifying moral relativism.Moral relativism is usually divided into descriptive relativism,normative relativism,and meta-ethical relativism.Descriptive relativists empirically emphasize the differences in moral dimensions between societies.Normative relativism holds that moral norms are relative to different societies and is therefore tolerant of moral differences between societies.Meta-ethical relativism,on the other hand,supports the existence of relative truths on the basis of opposition to the universal validity of moral standards.Hume constructs a stable system of moral judgement in the mechanism of bystander sympathy in terms of whether one is admired or pleased by the bystander(i.e.sympathy),and the impression,memory and association functions of reason play an important role.Moreover,the stability of virtue undoubtedly provides stability and consistency to practical moral behaviour.Hume attributes to sympathy the establishment of natural emotions and artificially designed virtues of a social nature.In this way,the virtue of sociality is associated with the happy or unhappy emotions of different people,allowing the emotions to render on the value of the virtue of society,and also making it possible for people to reach a communication with society that is conducive to the stability of human values.While Hume’s work involves discussion of empirical examples,this discussion remains aimed at the ultimate realization of a discursive approach to morality that reveals the principles behind experience,rather than a summary of experience that remains only on the surface,so Hume’s moral theory is not descriptive relativism.And the restrictions on moral principles that normative relativists emphasize also run counter to the universality of moral principles that Hume seeks.Moral relativism,as opposed to objectivism,rejects objective universals.It is often assumed that the objective universality of morality must be established through reason.Hume’s universality of moral sentiment does not satisfy the above requirement for universality and is therefore considered to be meta-ethical relativism.But what distinguishes meta-ethical relativism from other theories is its relativity,that is,the establishment of relative truths.Such relative truths are also established through reason,and it is also argued that a rational person can be justified in supporting certain moral judgments as true or false.Such relative truths do not satisfy Hume’s quest for universal moral principles on the one hand,and on the other hand the logical framework based on reason runs counter to Hume’s morality based on emotion.So Hume’s moral theory is necessarily inconsistent with this relativism and would not be meta-ethical relativism.