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On Sympathy In Hume's Treatise

Posted on:2011-10-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2155360305957053Subject:Foreign philosophy
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In Treatise Hmue endeavoured to find the simplest and fewest principles of human nature, laid on experience and observation, which can explain our knowledge, passion and morality. Among these principles of human nature, sympathy is the most significant one, which links Hume's epistemology to his moral psychology, and constitutes the foundation of his moral psychology and moral philosophy.Sympathy is first mentioned in Book II of the Treatise. Sympathy is not self a passion, such as pity or compassion. Rather it a mechanism of mind which takes place involuntarily and unreflectively, and by means of which the passions and ideas of others are imparted to us. However, sympathy is not an impartial mechanism, for it would more naturally flow to someone similar to oneself and toward those related to us by contiguity and causation.One of the main aims in Hume's moral psychology is to find the principles and mechanisms that generate our indirect passions, which contains: the principle of sympathy, the principle of double association of impressions and ideas, the principle of comparison and the principle of parallel direction of impulses. In these four principles, the principle of sympathy plays a key role. The principle of comparison can operate only after sympathy. Another two principles----the principle of double association of impressions and ideas and the principle of parallel direction of impulses, which seem to contradict with each other, would be governed by the principle of sympathy. When the sympathy is week, the former principle would work, and while the sympathy is strong, the latter principle will operate. So it is obvious that in Hume's moral psychology the principle of sympathy is the foundational principle which governs and regulates other principles that generate indirect passions.Hume's moral philosophy is based on his moral psychology. Hume argued that moral distinctions (viz. moral judgements or moral evaluations) are not derived from reason, but from moral sense which are particular feelings of pleasures and pains arised by the mechanism of sympathy. In this part Hume developed this theory of sympathy, On Hume's view, only sympathy is regulated by fixing on some general points of view can it be the principle from which the particular feelings are derived. The development of sympathy is due to the fact that the mechanism of sympathy is not impartial, but our moral distinctions are steady and impartial. Firstly, from the perspective of unregulated, we are more vulnerable to sympathize with those people who are related to me. This means that the moral evaluations would be variable. Secondly, the operation of sympathy is based on observing the actual results of someone's character traits. It means that only someone's good characters have actually beneficial effects, that can we regard he as a virtuous one. In other words, if someone who have a good character trait can not benefit others for some reasons that he/she can't control, we would not esteem he/she for his/her virtuous character trait any more. However, we evaluate a person by the possible effects to which his/her characters are inclined to give rise in our daily life. Namely, even a virtuous person was exiled to a uninhabited island, so his/her good characters can not benefit anyone, we still esteem he/her for his/her virtuous character traits.So only sympathy is regulated by fixing on some general points of view can it be the principle from which the particular feelings are derived. From the perspective of regulated sympathy, we do not concern about whether someone's good character traits would benefit me, but about whether his/her good qualities would benefit the people with whom he/she often contact. From the perspective of regulated sympathy, we evaluate someone's character traits based on the possible and usual results and tendencies of one's character traits, rather than the actual results of one's character traits. In this way, regulated sympathy ensures our moral judgements steady, impartial, objective and universal.Regulated sympathy also account for our motivation to be a virtuous person. Sympathy is a mechanism of communication, by which we can inherit other people's moral evaluation to us. Their approval would make me pleasure, and their disapproval would lead me pain. So sympathy would make me go beyond the self-interest. We would love our character traits, only if they would be approved by others who live in my narrow circle and by our society. What's more, from the perspective of regulated sympathy we are able to construct an ideal of character. Not only can it be logically deduced from regulated sympathy, but also it can be acquired by everyone.The significance of Hume's theory of sympathy can go beyond his own system.In Hume's time, one of the controversies about morality is whether moral requirements are natural or conventional. Hobbes seems them as conventional from the hypothesis that everyone is self-interested. Shaftesbury seems them as natural. Although the debate is intensive, none of them can present a satisfactory answer. On the one hand, the absolutely selfish contradicts the fact. On the other hand, the natural impulses of humanity can't entirely account for our approval of justice, for a single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest or private interest, its benefit is in the whole plan.Hume's theory of sympathy provided a satisfactory solution to the problem. He divides our virtues into two types: artificial virtues and natural virtues. From the perspective of unregulated sympathy, we would naturally approve the natural virtues, and from the perspective of regulated sympathy, we can approve the artificial virtues which were derived from selfish, but benefit us in the whole plan.Hume's theory of sympathy also contributes greatly to the development of moral philosophy. His theory affects Smith directly.
Keywords/Search Tags:Treatise, sympathy, regulated sympathy, moral psychology, moral philosophy
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