Based On The Model Of "Credit Claiming-Blame Avoidance" Behavioral Logic

As explorers and practitioners of local government,grassroots cadres play an important role in the process of local change.In recent years,as social change continues to advance,the phenomenon of blame avoidance among cadres at all levels has frequently emerged,causing a systematic impact on grassroots governance.The negative effects caused by such behaviour interact with the negative effects of the "promotion tournaments" model,which is more discussed in academic circles,making the behaviour of cadres in China’s townships present a situation in which they both claim credit and avoid responsibility.Therefore,the question of how to reduce the negative effects brought about by credit taking and blame avoidance,and how to bring into play the positive effects of township cadres’ performance and entrepreneurship,has become an important proposition for discussion and practice in various regions.This article builds an analytical framework of "Credit claiming-Blame avoidance" based on the promotion tournament theory and the theory of blame avoidance behaviour.Taking township D,where the pilot village was selected to undertake the pilot project of the livelihood complex,as an example,we study the behaviour of township cadres by describing the specific process of selection.At the same time,the specific blame avoidance strategies adopted by township cadres in the pilot process,their impact and the causes behind them are dissected.The current spread of blame avoidance behaviour is mainly due to real-life dilemmas such as the separation of powers and responsibilities and high-handed accountability.On this basis,it is concluded that the invitation to credit and the avoidance of respons i bility behaviour that emerged among township cadres are two sides of the same coin.Finally,feasible optimization measures were proposed for two types of behavior problems,in order to provide useful references for adjusting cadre behavior.At the level of reducing the one-sided pursuit of political achievements and claiming credit,measures such as reforming the performance assessment system of cadres,accelerating the democratic supervision mechanism and increasing the disciplinary measures for cadres who violate the rules are suggested.On the level of reducing cadres’ avoidance of responsibility and inaction,measures such as deepening administrative system and institutional reform,building a dynamic risk prevention and control mechanism,and improving the personnel incentive and restraint system are suggested to be amended.In conclusion,this paper is based on practice,identifying problems,exploring reasons,and proposing countermeasures,seeking to help optimize the behaviour of township cadres,reduce distorted incentives and inaction,and improve the effectiveness of cadres in performing their duties.