The Consummation Research Of The Supervisory Board System Of Listed Companies In The Era Of Strong Supervision

Strong regulation emphasizes a policy orientation,indicating that the regulatory situation of listed companies is becoming stricter.Once a listed company engages in illegal or irregular behavior,it may lead to legal liability.Therefore,in the era of "strong regulation",higher requirements have been put forward for listed companies.In line with the requirements of the era of "strong supervision" in China’s securities capital market,it is imperative to improve the internal supervision mechanism of companies.In essence,the improvement of China’s supervisory board system is the issue of how to construct the internal governance supervision mechanism of Chinese companies.In recent years,the occurrence of financial fraud in many listed companies has attracted people’s attention to internal supervision of listed companies.The failure of the supervisory board to effectively play a supervisory role is one of the important reasons,and the system of the company’s supervisory board urgently needs to be improved.The improvement of the supervisory board system is not only an inevitable requirement for building effective corporate governance,but also a necessary requirement for achieving sustainable development of the company.Based on the above background,this article takes the supervisory board of listed companies in China as the research object,Explored how to The improvement path of the supervisory board system of listed companies in China under the era of strong supervision is not within the scope of this article due to institutional adjustments.Firstly,this article analyzes the current situation of the supervisory board system of listed companies in China,elaborates on the historical evolution and legal provisions of the supervisory board system of listed companies in China,indicating that the supervisory board system of listed companies in China has been gradually improved.However,there are still shortcomings in the supervisory board system in China at present This is manifested in the lack of independence of the supervisory board,poor performance of its functions,inadequate constraints and incentive mechanisms for supervisors,and lack of coordination between the supervisory board and independent directors,which makes it difficult for it to adapt to the requirements of the era of "strong supervision".Secondly,a comprehensive analysis was conducted on the reasons for the failure of the supervisory board from five aspects: the impact of historical and cultural environmental factors,the strong dependence characteristics within the supervisory board,the institutional guarantee for the exercise of supervisory powers,the absence of supporting mechanisms for the supervisory board,and the coordination of functions between the supervisory board and independent directors.On the basis of analyzing the current problems and reasons for the failure of the supervisory board in China,this article summarizes the regulations of the supervisory board system in several typical foreign countries,compares the legislative provisions of the supervisory board system in typical foreign countries,and mainly selects the legislative experience of Germany,Japan,and France for learning,aiming to provide reference ideas for the construction of the supervisory board system in China.Finally,based on the analysis of the reasons for the weakening of the functions of the supervisory board of listed companies in China and the rational reference of relevant experience in foreign supervisory board systems,several targeted measures are proposed to improve the supervisory board system of listed companies in China,further strengthening the independence of the supervisory board,improving the authority of the supervisory board,improving the connection system between the supervisory board and independent directors,establishing reasonable incentives and corresponding responsibility systems,Only in this way can the supervisory board truly play its supervisory role and improve the governance level of listed companies in China.