Research On The Allocation Of Administrative Supervision Power In The Market Exit Of Financial Institutions

On the whole,the situation of market exit of domestic and international financial institutions has become severe again in the new era,as the internal reform of the financial industry at home and abroad is getting deeper and deeper,and the external regulation has been tightened comprehensively,especially the administrative regulation of the issue of market exit of financial institutions has been strengthened in the institutional setting.Administrative supervision is the intervention and involvement of the government’s public power in the market economy,mainly in the form of directly restricting the rights or increasing the obligations of market subjects,and the premise of the existence of administrative supervision is the principle of market failure,so it can be said that strengthening administrative supervision on the market exit of financial institutions is the inevitable result of the game between government control and market autonomy.In order to control the adverse effects brought about by the market exit of financial institutions,the intervention of administrative supervision is currently a common practice to resolve the risk of market exit of financial institutions.In this article,two typical cases of administrative supervision of the market exit of two commercial banks,Jinzhou Bank and Baoshang Bank,are selected for introduction.In the cases,the administrative supervisory authorities tend to adopt multiple resolution measures to resolve the crisis,using a combination of administrative penalties,administrative coercion and other administrative means to achieve certain results.The evaluation of the results of administrative supervision,i.e.the analysis of the effectiveness of administrative supervision in the market exit of financial institutions,relies on two criteria: whether it is effective in resolving financial risks,and whether it can correctly handle the relationship between administrative control and market autonomy.A dialectical view of the role played by administrative regulation in the process of market exit of financial institutions should recognise both the positive impact of administrative intervention on risk mitigation and the harm that the absence or excess of regulatory power would cause to the free market.The utility of this two-sided approach is inextricably linked to the normative basis and power structure of the administrative regulatory power itself.The exit of financial institutions from the market has significant implications,and only a tightly regulated legal system can provide adequate safeguards for the exercise of administrative regulatory powers,and China’s financial legislation has been working in a more regulated direction.A tightly centralised central supervision combined with an independently operating local regulatory system has been established,supplemented by a plurality of administrative dispositions.However,this does not mean that we have established a perfect system.The current operational legal mechanism for the market exit of financial institutions is deficient in terms of the subject of authority,the limits of authority,the procedural settings and the supervision and remedial aspects.In order to remedy the shortcomings,the reform has changed the CBRC to the General Administration of Financial Supervision and Administration at the central level,and at the local level requires the government to set up a body specialised in financial supervision,in order to change the situation of regulatory competition in the past.In order to achieve synergy between central and local regulatory powers under the new financial regulatory system,efforts can be made in a number of ways to find a solution to the unbalanced power structure.The reconfiguration of financial regulatory powers in the market exit of financial institutions must deal with the relationship between central and local,administrative and judicial pairs,and carry out specific institutional design.A dynamic adjustment mechanism of central and local supervision should be established in order to realise the mutual adjustment of central and local supervisory powers under the new financial supervision system,and efforts should be made to achieve synergy between administrative supervisory powers and judicial adjudication powers.In addition,the realization of the balance of rights also depends on the establishment and improvement of the system of supervision and remedy of administrative regulatory power.