| Chinese securities market has achieved remarkable achievement after 10 years' development in spite of the problems, such as the inefficiency to punish the wrongful acts by China Securities Regulatory Commission in the fields of government regulation. It is in need of theoretical support and systematic research on how the government carrying out its regulation to achieve the corresponding target.This thesis focuses on the government regulatory power on securities market, starting logically from the concept of government regulatory power on securities market, pointing out that the definition of government regulatory power in securities market refers to the power for certain government agencies on behalf of the state to supervise and govern all bodies and their acts in this market, to make corresponding regulations and policies and execute them, as well as the power to punish illegal acts in the process of fulfilling the function of regulation in security market for the purpose of meeting certain established goals. Government regulatory power is carried out in a narrow sense, which excludes self-discipline. This concept puts different agencies in every country performing state security regulatory function within the research fields on government regulatory power, which makes it more widely applied.Then, the author compares the evolution of government regulatory power in developed countries and newly-developing market countries via historical analysis and comparison analysis approaches, summarizes the common nature of government regulatory power in security market. When and how government regulatory power in securities market intervenes, and what is the degree of intervention is determined by government function orientation influenced by political and economic contexts in each country, which also determines to establish single or more regulatory agencies. Government regulation has to be combined with self-discipline. For newly developing market countries, the power limit between different government regulatory agencies and the different parts in one regulatory agency in the market should be made clear to achieve the efficiency. To prevent the harm caused by the extension of government regulatory power in securities market, public, flexible procedure putting more attention on the protection of the supervised should be made, as well as multi-level supervision system to guarantee the application of this power. Therefore, in practice, the core target to improve government security regulatory power is to help the application in a normative way efficiently to protect the investors and foster the development of the security market. The improvement of Chinese government regulatory power in securities market should learn from this.The common nature is not only proved by the practice in each country, but also supported by theories such as "Enhancing the market-type" government theory, "Lean state" theory and constitutional government. "Enhancing the market-type" government provides theoretical support for developing countries carrying out compelling systematic arrangement in forming and developing securities market from the institutional economics perspective, and pointing that this power should be carried out under the constitution and laws and market laws. "Lean state" theory points out the necessity to allocate powers among government security regulatory agency, self-disciplined agency and other government regulatory agency from the perspective of public administration. Constitution government theory proves that the government security regulatory power should be performed efficiently under the control of constitution and laws from judicial perspective. These three theories belongs to different disciplines with different perspectives, but their common purpose is to discuss how to carry allocate and perform government power in a efficient and normative way in the aim of providing theoretical guide for government security regulatory power design. These three theories propose the thought on institutional design to carry out government regulatory power in securities market effectively and normatively.Based on the theoretical analysis, the thesis sets its foot on proposing specific institutional design from the level of current laws and regulations targeting the problems in Chinese government regulatory power in securities market, via normative and empirical analysis approaches within Chinese government regulatory institutional context. The core issue in this aspect lies that the power allocation is not reasonable and its function is not normative, which lead to the low efficiency in execution. We can find from the practice in each country, this a common issue in each country especially in newly developing market countries. The unreasonable allocation is manifested by the overlapping of three levels supervision bodies, that is, there's no clear power distinction between government regulatory body and self-disciplined body, between different government regulatory agencies, between inner parts of the same agency. That the performing of the regulatory power is not normative is caused by the lack procedure on power execution. The superficial reason to cause the above problems lies that the corresponding laws and regulations need to be improved, but the deep-rooted reason lies in the institutional context faced by Chinese government security regulatory power, which is called institutional factors here. These factors determines the current conditions on Chinese government regulatory power, thus causes the low efficiency in power performing. Therefore, this condition can not be changed in a through way via legal research only. Our research can only propose specific improving advices via reviewing current laws and regulations, analyzing typical cases, finding problems in power allocation, power performing procedure, and power performing safeguard systems. Under the guide of the above three theories, the thesis propose the following legal institutional design in the aim of "improving the performance of Chinese government security regulatory power in a more efficient and normative way".First is the legal institutional design on power performing in a more efficient way from the level of power allocation. To achieve this, power should be allocated reasonably in three levels, between securities regulatory commission and the self-disciplined agencies, between securities regulatory commission and other government agencies, between different parts in securities regulatory commission. From the future tendency, securities regulatory commission should perform its core function from a macro level, punish the illegal acts, gradually return the power back to the market, and let the self-disciplined body supervise the routine supervision. The power in other government regulatory agencies should be collected and rearranged to achieve the unified regulation by securities regulatory commission. The sending agencies, security regulatory bureaus should be endowed corresponding supervision power. To meet the regulatory reality, under the principles of putting self-discipline in priority, government regulation in a macro-way and regulation efficiency securities regulatory commission may consider stipulating the regulatory power of security regulatory bureau and other corresponding powers in the form of regulation.Second is the legal institutional design for the normative performance of regulatory power from the procedural perspective. From the legal stipulation level, the procedure applied by securities regulatory commission lacks publicity, flexibility, public participation and concerns on the supervised. From the value orientation level, the procedure applied by securities regulatory commission can not help to reach balance between the protection of the investors and the promotion of supervision efficiency. To guarantee the normative performance of the regulatory power by securities regulatory commission, the regulatory procedure has to be design in accordance with modern regulation concepts under the principles of independence, transparency and public participation, efficiency, and remedy. To deal with the deficiencies in the procedure itself, we should learn from the helpful experience from US and Britain. The thesis also proposes the specific advices on improving the corresponding procedures.The third is the legal institutional design to ensure the normative performance of regulatory power under protecting mechanism. Concerning the protecting mechanism in the securities regulatory commission, first, the improvement of the inner regulatory structure should be fostered, which is the base for the exterior mechanism to be in order. Second, the logical mistakes of the securities regulatory commission on administrative review should be corrected, the explanation on the fields of the appliers on administrative review should be extended, the terminal verdict by the state council should be eliminated. Concerning the exterior protecting mechanism, a long term supervision mechanism from the people's congress is to be established with a reasonable definition on the border between the supervision from the congress and the government security regulation. As far as the protecting mechanism from the judicial level, the supervision from the court can not be neglected. In a word, multi-level and effective protecting mechanisms are to be established to limit the supervision from the securities regulatory commission in a normative way.The core target for government regulation is its effective performance with normative performance as its premise. Power allocation, power performance procedure and power performance protecting mechanism are to be carried out around the target of effective and normative performance. The thesis consists of six chapters specifically.Chapterâ… is the "definition on government regulatory power on securities market". It plays a role of defining the outer part and inner implications of government regulatory power on securities market, and providing logical premise for the following research. This chapter consists of 3 sections, Government regulatory power on security market refers to the power endowed to organizations on behalf of the state performing the function of supervising the security market for certain targets, which includes the power to supervise and control all the entities in this market, the power to make relative laws and institutions as well as the power to carry out them. In a narrower way, government supervision power on security market excludes self-discipline. This concept makes non-governmental organizations on behalf of government enter the fields of research. There are many aspects for government supervision power on securities market, of which, the power to make laws and institutions, the power to review before a stock become one part in the market, and the power to investigate unlawful acts and punish them are the core . With the help of the first two sections, the third section makes the outer sides of government regulatory power on securities market clear after the comparison with the neighboring concepts. In whole, government regulatory power on security market is part of financial regulatory power.Chapterâ…¡is "the evolution of government regulatory power on securities market". The first section selects developed countries as examples, while the second section selects some developing countries as examples. Then this chapter proposes the common nature for a government supervision power on securities market, which is also a problem to be settled. First, it is a problem to be settled to define reasonable power limitations for organization with government regulatory power on securities market and organizations of self-discipline, as well as the bound between other government regulatory organ and inner governmental regulatory organ. For newly marketing countries, before we go to the above problem, we have to solve the issue on how to make clear the legal position on self-discipline organization and helping these organizations functioning well. Second, it is many countries common sense to strengthen the regulion on securities market, to perform the regulation under legal procedure and to protect the legal rights of the supervisedChapterâ…¢is "the theoretical basis for the institutional design on government regulatory power in securities market". This chapter introduces three different theories, "Enhancing the market-type" government theory, "Lean state" theory and constitutional government theory, proving the rightness and reasonability for government regulatory power on securities market proposed in Chapterâ…¡, which provides theoretical foundation for institutional design on government regulatory power on securities market. Section four applies the above three theories to propose the thought on how the government regulation in security market could perform effectively and normatively.Under the basis of theoretical research on government regulatory power on securities market, Chapterâ…£,â…¤,â…¥carries out it study on government regulatory power on securities market from the empirical level via analysis on regulation and experience. Chapterâ…£reasons how to perform regulatory power on securities market for the regulatory commission efficiently from the view of allocating the specific power, with Chapter V from the regulation procedure and Chapter VI from the view of constructing the safeguard to help the regulatory power under control. For factors out of law influencing the allocation and performing of regulatory power on securities market, they are discussed under more macro institutional context to provide more practical advices.Chapterâ…£is "the prospect of the allocation on government regulatory power on securities market". There are five sections here. In the first section, the author proposes the future trend on power allocation on the basis of analyzing the factors out of law influencing the allocation on government regulatory power on securities market. The following sections propose corresponding advices via data analysis. The position on Chinese government function is the core reason to influence the power allocation between regulatory commission on securities market and self discipline organization. The department interests' competition makes government regulatory power on securities market dispersed in different government departments, which are the institutional context to allocate power faced by Chinese regulatory commission on security market. Therefore in a long time this condition will not be changed. To deal with the regulation reality, the regulatory commission on security market may play greater role in many fields with the direction of the disciplines of self-discipline first and governmental regulation macroscopically, while the security association may put emphasis on disputes solving, stock company supervision, and market innovation and so on. To solve the state of "too many supervisors", it may be considered to introduce competing mechanism, helping the mutual activities among different regulatory entities. Necessary power to punish wrongful acts is in great need for security market regulatory bodies.Chapterâ…¤is "the prospect of the procedure on the performance of government regulatory power in securities market". This chapter consists of five sections. First section proposed the principle for Chinese government to perform regulatory power on security market. The author discussed the performing procedures in the following sections, and proposes improving advices and the construction of performing procedure for the regulatory commission on security market. The regulatory procedure should find balance between the supervision body and the bodies being supervised. In whole, there are many problems for the performing procedure carried out by regulatory commission on security market. To solve these problems, regulatory commission on security market should learn from good examples, follow established principles, and performs its power efficiently under due procedure. The legal institutional design under the procedural perspective on the normative performance of the regulation is to be proposed in this chapter. Chapterâ…¥is "the protecting mechanisms on the normative performance of government regulatory power in securities market". Section I focuses on the inner supervision in securities regulatory commission, pointing its logical mistake, that is, "to be his own judge". The following four sections focus on the protecting exterior mechanisms of the supervision system. It is pointed in this part the superficial reason for the regulatory commission evading the supervision from the people's congress is caused by the nature of the commission, while the ultimate reason lies in the deficiency in the supervision system from the people's congress. This part also points out that the supervision from the people's congress should reasonably define the border between supervision from the people's congress and government regulation in securities market. The third section focuses on the judicial protecting mechanism, which points out that the deficiency in administrative lawsuit and the special consideration on the special position and role of the securities regulatory commission are the reasons for the judicial supervision not performing well. Section four focuses on media supervision. Conflicts come from the industrialization of media and information disclosure requirement from the securities regulatory commission makes the supervision from the media less effective. To foster the effective supervision from the media, the border between the media's reporting rights and the honor rights of the security regulatory power is to be made clear. In the end, the thesis proposes legal institutions design on the normative performance of government regulatory power in securities market from the protecting mechanism dimension.This thesis hopes to provide theoretical analysis scheme on the coming corresponding research, the ultimate aim of this thesis is how to realize the effective and normative performance of Chinese government security regulatory power to provide reference and guide for Chinese government regulatory agencies.
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