Research On Anti-monopoly Regulation Of Super-platform’s Self-preferential Behavior

With the advent of the era of big data,Internet platforms have emerged in turn,and the competition among super platforms has become fierce.The technology of big data and algorithms has raised new problems while promoting the platform to obtain high revenue,and self-preferential behavior has gradually aroused concern.At the present stage,the anti-monopoly law regulation of platform self-preferential behavior is controversial due to the difficulties in determining the illegality of self-preferential treatment and in law enforcement and supervision.Therefore,it is necessary to clarify the connotation,nature and impact of self-dealing behavior of super platforms,optimize the legal regulation of self-dealing behavior from the perspective of innovative regulatory models,and realize the further expansion of antitrust jurisprudence to the Internet field,so as to better stabilize the fair and orderly market competition order and protect the interests of consumers and other competitors.This paper,excluding the introduction and conclusion,consists of four main parts,each of which is briefly described as follows:In the first part,the basic theories related to self-advantageous treatment in super platforms are explained.It defines the connotation and characteristics of "super platform" and "self-preferential treatment",clarifies the responsibilities of super platform,analyzes the different manifestations of self-preferential treatment,identifies the positive and negative effects of self-preferential treatment,and reasonably distinguishes legitimate self-preferential treatment from illegal self-preferential treatment.The second part analyzes the current status of regulation and regulatory dilemma of self-preferential behavior of super platforms.By reviewing and analyzing the new provisions of the anti-monopoly law on the regulation of platforms,and referring to the specific provisions of the Anti-monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy and the Regulations on Prohibition of Abuse of Market Dominance on self-preferential treatment,combined with the analysis of relevant cases and legal application,it is found that it is difficult to determine the nature of self-preferential treatment in practice,and it is unclear as to the main parties for the regulation of platform behavior.The lack of technical barriers and trial experience has posed many difficulties for the enforcement and regulation of self-exempted acts on super platforms.The third part examines the regulatory attitudes and approaches of the European Union,Germany and the United States in dealing with super-platform self-preference.The analysis focuses on the gatekeeper system in the EU Digital Marketplace Act,the new regulation in the German Anti-Restriction of Competition Act and the relevant regulation in the US Innovation and Choice Online Act.By examining and comparing the regulatory features of these countries and regions in this area,the analysis summarises the inspiration of the overseas experience for China,especially the feasibility of ex ante regulation in China,taking into account China’s national conditions and the current status of regulation.The fourth part puts forward feasible suggestions for the anti-monopoly law regulation of self-advantaged behavior of super platforms.It also proposes to strengthen the combination of external and internal regulation and to innovate the digital regulation model in order to ensure the healthy and orderly development of the platform economy.