| Throughout India’s post-independence history,the civil-military relationship has had a significant impact on almost every foreign security issue.During the British colonial rule,the Indian army acted as a pawn of the British colonialists to suppress the independence movement of the Indian people,which left a bad impression in the mind of the founding generation of leaders of India,but the establishment of a set of principles of civil-military relationship was accepted by them.For India,which has just gained independence,the army is needed to maintain its own security and keep a high alert against the military’s possible interference in politics.In 1947,India became independent,and a transformation aimed at "Indianizing" the colonial armies began.India has retained and affirmed the British colonial model of civilian control,and has reformed on this basis.Under Nehru,Indian leaders maintained a high degree of control over the armed forces,not only strengthening their political control over the army,but also trying to intervene in the military professional sphere.This relationship was widely questioned during the 1962 border war with India.Later,India began to adjust the civil-military relationship,adopting the Huntington’s "objective control model" to reclassify the functions of the military and the government.This adjustment established principles that continue to this day.Although this division has improved military effectiveness and stood the test of war,it has brought about a series of problems,which not only troubled India,but also had a great impact on the security of South Asia.It can be said that a series of security issues in South Asia so far have been directly or indirectly influenced by India’s civil-military relationship.The development of civil-military relationship in India after independence can be divided into two periods.With the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 as the boundary,the civil-military relationship was characterized by the strict civilian control mode before and the loss of independence of the army,and then by the partial restoration of military autonomy.The military created the "1962 narrative" and constantly engaged in dynamic games with the civilian government around autonomy.This pattern has made the Indian army offensive and one of the domestic variables that often leads to conflict in the border region.Can the study of civil-military relationship in Western political theory suit the national conditions of developing countries? What impact will the civil-military relationship system established in this mode have on national and regional security?Exploring the relationship between India’s military and government is not only useful for the study of South Asian regional security,but also has more experience and lessons for developing countries to deal with and explore their own civil-military relationship and national security construction.The research of this paper is mainly carried out from the following aspects:The first part mainly introduces and sorts out the basic concepts and relevant theories,and clarifies the relationship and influence between civil-military relationship,national security and regional security.The second part takes India as the research object,and mainly sorts out the three stages of the development of civil-military relationship in India after independence,and clarifies its evolution and characteristics.The third part is the key content,that is,the security impact of India’s military-government relations.The civil-military relationship model established by India is indeed conducive to domestic stability,but it leads to greater autonomy of the army and lack of top-level civilian guidance in military construction.For India,the realization of regional security strategy is hindered,military effectiveness is greatly affected,and it cannot effectively deal with national security threats.For the region,it deepens the regional security dilemma and makes the regional security crisis escalate.For our part,creating instability on the border casts a shadow over the deepening of cooperation between the two countries.The fourth part mainly summarizes the experience and lessons of India’s civil-military relationship,and provides reference for relevant developing countries.The evolution of civil-military relationship in India not only provides relevant countries with successful experience on how to realize civilian control of the military and avoid military coup,but also shows the deficiencies of Huntington’s objective control model.For developing countries,it is not only necessary to consider the establishment of civilian control model,but also should pay attention to the establishment of a reasonable civil-military relationship model,maximize military effectiveness,and avoid the power of interest groups,resulting in the lack of reform in the later stage. |