Since the late 1970 s,with the reform and opening up,China’s market economy structure has been undergoing new transformation and upgrading,the financial market has been booming,and a large number of listed companies have emerged.In order to better conduct corporate financing,listed companies usually adopt the way of related guarantee.Due to its strong strength and good reputation in the society,listed companies have huge advantages as guarantors.If the related guarantee of listed companies is properly used,it will help enterprises to expand the scale and promote the development of the financial market.However,in judicial practice,listed companies frequently violate the rules to conduct related guarantee and damage the interests of the company,and even form a guarantee circle of companies in a specific region.If one company fails to repay its debt,it will lead to systemic risks of the whole guarantee chain.One of the reasons for these situations lies in the increasingly complex competitive environment of Chinese market.In the process of affiliated guarantee of listed companies,many controlling shareholders of companies have emerged to infringe the interests of the company and minority shareholders by taking advantage of their control rights.Although existing Chinese laws regulate the affiliated guarantee of listed companies to a certain extent,However,in the face of the complex situation and practical problems in some cases,it is still insufficient to further study and improve the legal regulation of related guarantee of listed companies.By defining the basic concept of related guarantee of Chinese listed companies,this paper analyzes that controlling shareholders may infringe the interests of listed companies and minority shareholders by taking advantage of their equity,makes a comprehensive and systematic review of relevant Chinese laws and regulations,and points out the problems that need to be solved in the existing legal regulation system.Reasonable suggestions are given from the Angle of perfecting the legal system.The thesis begins with six parts,firstly stating the significance of topic selection and the status quo of research at home and abroad,etc.Secondly,the concept of related guarantee of listed companies is comprehensively sorted out.The third part and the fourth part jointly explain the specific existing legal provisions of listed companies related guarantee is not systematic,the shareholder voting right exclusion system has defects,the existing legal provisions of information disclosure system in practice is not strong operability,the controlling shareholder,the director’s duty of loyalty responsibility system is missing,the non-standard related guarantee after remedy is not perfect and Shareholder derivative action system is not perfect and other problems.After that,the fifth part mainly analyzes the legal provisions of some countries on related guarantee of listed companies,and the attitude of most countries towards related guarantee changes from prohibition at the beginning to tolerance and support.Finally,by combing the legal system of related guarantee of listed companies and analyzing and referring to foreign relevant legislation,this paper puts forward relevant regulation suggestions on related guarantee of listed companies.As for the great test brought to us by the complex and severe reality,we should realize that things are constantly revised and improved in the process of development and renewal.In the case that the existing laws cannot meet the requirements of related guarantee regulation of listed companies,it is necessary for us to conduct in-depth analysis and discussion on this issue and solve the problems of legal regulation in related fields as soon as possible,so as to provide guidance for related guarantee behavior of listed companies and help the high-quality development of China’s economy. |