| Employers’ joint restriction of competition is a consensual act committed by employers’ alliances to fix their existing talent advantages and maintain or reduce human resources investment in recent domestic and foreign practice.The "self-regulatory pact" signed by Wenzhou private schools and the "no-poaching" agreement signed by Pinduoduo and Tencent are typical manifestations of employers’ joint restriction of competition,but they are not properly regulated.Based on this,this thesis firstly analyzes the concept,manifestation and causes of employer joint restriction of competition,and further clarifies the necessity of regulating this behavior.Secondly,on the basis of summarizing and analyzing the present situation of the regulation of employers’ joint restriction of competition in our country,the current problems are put forward.Then,this thesis analyzes the theory and practice of regulation in the United States,which is more mature in this field,and summarize the relevant experience.Finally,this thesis tries to put forward the regulatory path for employers’ joint restriction of competition in China,taking into account the actual situation in China.This thesis consists of four parts,corresponding to four chapters.Chapter One is a theoretical analysis of employers’ joint restriction of competition.The first section discusses the concept and manifestation of joint restriction of competition by employers respectively,and further clarifies the joint restriction of competition by employers from a theoretical perspective.The second section analyzes the causes of this behavior from two aspects,namely,the inability of non-competition agreements to meet the needs of employers to maximize their interests and the existence of certain regulatory gaps in competition in the labor market.The third section clearly puts forward the necessity of regulating this behavior.Chapter Two analyzes the cases of "Wenzhou Private School Signing Self-Regulatory Pact" and "Pinduoduo and Tencent Signing Non-Poaching Agreement" in China,which lead to the current situation and problems of regulation of employers’ joint restriction of competition in China.The first section analyzes the current situation of regulation from the perspective of labor law and anti-monopoly law respectively,while the second section suggests that there are three problems in China,namely the lack of a clear anti-monopoly law,the lack of a system of recognition of such behavior,and the lack of a guideline document that provides clear guidance to relevant subjects.Chapter Three focuses on the current regulatory theory and practice in the United States,which is more mature in this field.The first section analyzes the shift of the regulatory theory in the United States from the indirect application of the antitrust law based on the existence of a transmission relationship between the labor market and the commodity market to the direct application of the antitrust law based on the existence of monopolistic behavior in the labor market,which lays the foundation for further specific regulatory measures.The next two sections summarize and analyze the specific regulatory measures of the U.S.on employers’ joint restriction of competition from two aspects,namely,the introduction of antitrust law enforcement documents and the construction of criteria for determining employers’ joint restriction of competition.Chapter Four is a proposal for the regulation of joint employer restriction of competition in China.The first section discusses that China should explicitly use the antitrust law to regulate the act,which requires clarifying the reasonableness of the expansion application of the Antitrust Law in the labor market on the one hand,and the possibility of including the act into the scope of monopoly agreement under Article 17 of the Antitrust Law by means of judicial interpretation on the other hand.The second section attempts to construct a system for determining the joint restriction of competition by employers in China from three aspects: formal elements,substantive elements and exemption rules.The third section discusses that China can further refine the specific system by introducing special guidelines. |