The Normative Application Of WTO Countervailing Rules In Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform

Since the G20 Pittsburgh Summit commitments in 2009,there have been significantly more international discussions about fossil fuel subsidies.International governance on the regulation of fossil fuel subsidies is being explored,but it has not yet produced any legally binding provisions.Since it has consistently avoided fossil fuel subsidies,the WTO — the only international organisation with legally binding authority to deal with subsidies — creates a de facto barrier,according to some.Following the reform of fisheries subsidies that some countries have proposed to the WTO,reform of fossil fuel subsidies is currently on the WTO’s agenda.As a result,this paper acknowledges the historical legitimacy of fossil fuel subsidies as a specific economic tool while also examining their detrimental effects on climate change,competition distortion,and the advancement of renewable energy sources.The normative flaws of the WTO’s response to the issue of fossil fuel subsidy reform are explored from a jurisprudential perspective in the new phase of reform entering the WTO’s work agenda,and the paper analyses the WTO’s response to the issue.The contents of this paper are as follows:Chapter 1 defines fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies to clarify the subject of this study.In general,definitions are the first step towards understanding,managing and regulating things,but the prolonged difficulty in reaching an international consensus on the definition of fossil fuel subsidies is the first major challenge that stands in the way of reform;rather than finding a precise definition of fossil fuel subsidies,many scholars have turned to identifying the fossil fuel subsidies that have the greatest adverse impacts.Translated with www.Deep L.com/Translator(free version)The application of current WTO rules to fossil fuel subsidies is covered in Chapter 2.Along the lines of subsidy regulation,transparency,and dispute resolution,the chapter also discusses how inadequate the current rules are to deal with fossil fuel subsidies.Such flaws relate to the SCM agreement’s lack of specificity in regulating industrial subsidies,the Trade Policy Review Mechanism’s ineffectiveness and formality of the subsidy transparency rules,and the challenges brought on by the Dispute Settlement Body’s continued avoidance of fossil fuel subsidies.The treatment of fossil fuel subsidies during various GATT/WTO eras is compared longitudinally in Chapter 3 along with the policies of various international organisations.The horizontal comparison includes the G20 initiative and attempts at the Voluntary Peer Review Mechanism(VPRM)and regional free trade agreements(RFAs): these attempts have provided preliminary information and invaluable experience for WTO reform.The vertical comparison includes attempts to limit subsidies in the GATT and Tokyo Round,opportunities to limit fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO era,and New Zealand’s promotion of the WTO’s fossil fuel reform programme.Chapter 4 provides a clear direction for the reform of the fossil fuel subsidy system within the WTO framework from two levels: the application of existing rules and the supplementation of new rules.The chapter is based on the development dilemma of limiting fossil fuel subsidies and the application of the system,and it makes reference to the development practise of the relevant system under the multilateral perspective.The third section acknowledges our nation’s fundamental circumstances,including our high reliance on fossil fuels for economic growth and our leadership role in environmental protection and climate change mitigation,and it stresses the significance of taking effective action for our nation.In order to lessen the pressure for reform at the source of norms,we should first actively participate in the reform discussions and present the idea of reforming fossil fuel subsidies in a classified and step-by-step manner;second,we should make full use of the treaty acceptance process.Second,by delaying our acceptance of the treaty,we should buy time for reform.Lastly,to lower the risk of non-compliance,we should review our domestic subsidy policy and change the way that subsidies are provided.