Research On The Impact Of Mixed-ownership Executive Incentives On Investment Efficiency

China has been exploring the economic system with its own characteristics.How to make enterprises develop better and how to enhance the value of enterprises has always been the focus of the business community and has become an important research direction for scholars.Develop mixed ownership,complement the advantages of different types of ownership and develop together,further improve the modern enterprise system and market competition mechanism,and force state-owned enterprises to improve the efficiency of asset use to become more competitive in the market.Whether an enterprise can make an effective investment plays a vital role in its long-term development,and is also one of the important measures of enterprise value.Only investing assets in projects with a net present value greater than zero is an efficient investment.The purpose of the executive incentive contract is to design a reasonable salary incentive system,so that the interests of executives and shareholders tend to be consistent,and encourage the company’s executives to use the company’s internal resources to invest in some valuable projects and improve the efficiency of corporate investment.Therefore,this article aims to explore whether the reform of mixed ownership enterprises is beneficial to the investment efficiency of enterprises and the effectiveness of the incentive measures implemented,and the impact of the degree of ownership mixture on the relationship between executive incentives and investment efficiency.In this paper,a total of 2984 samples of state-owned mixed ownership enterprises from 2013 to 2018 were obtained through screening and sorting.Taking the mixed ownership of mixed ownership enterprises and executive incentives as explanatory variables,the negative absolute value of the residual result calculated by the Richard model was taken as The explanatory variables,plus other factors that may affect the investment efficiency of the company,are used as control variables to construct the model.The empirical results show that: first,the degree of ownership mix is significantly positively correlated with investment efficiency;second,the monetary compensation incentives and equity incentives of executives are significantly positively correlated with investment efficiency;third,the degree of ownership mix for currency compensation incentives and investment efficiency The positive correlation has a significant positive adjustment effect,and the degree of ownership mix has a negative adjustment effect on the positive correlation between equity incentives and investment efficiency,but it is not significant.Fourth,the mixed ownership enterprises are divided into high-scale groups and low-scale groups.The high-and low-scale groups have a positive correlation between the degree of ownership ownership and investment efficiency,executive incentives and investment efficiency,and the degree of ownership ownership between monetary compensation incentives and investment efficiency.The positive correlation of the relationship has a positive regulatory effect.Fifth,the mixed ownership enterprises are divided into commercial competition and specific functional enterprises.Commercial competition-type mixed state-owned enterprises have a positive correlation between the degree of ownership ownership and investment efficiency,executive incentives and investment efficiency,and the degree of ownership ownership mixed with monetary compensation.The positive correlation between incentives and investment efficiency has a positive regulatory effect,and the degree of ownership mix has a positive regulatory effect on the positive correlation between equity incentives and investment efficiency,but it is not significant.Based on the results of empirical research,this article makes the following three recommendations: first,the development of mixed ownership to encourage diversification of equity;second,the establishment of a diversified executive incentive mechanism;third,to improve the degree of information disclosure of listed companies.