Research On The Influence Of Exchange Annual Report Inquiry Letter On Listed Companies’ Overinvestment Behavior

With the change of the government’s supervision idea and the implementation of the registration system reform,perfecting the financial supervision system and innovating the supervision method become the new trend of the financial supervision reform.The stock exchange is located in the front line of market regulation,and it pays attention to,questions and supervises the operation and manAgement of the company through the annual report inquiry letter,which is a non-penalty supervision method.As an important measure of regulatory innovation of listed companies,what is the effect of annual report inquiry letter on the supervision of listed companies?This topic has been paid more and more attention by theoretical and practical circles.From the perspective of investment behavior of listed companies,this thesis uses annual report inquiry function to study the correlation between non-penalized regulation and overinvestment behavior.Firstly,the thesis defines the concepts of annual report inquiry letter and over-investment behavior respectively,and reviews the reLevant literature of exchange inquiry letter,inefficient investment and external financing dependence.Secondly,based on principal-Agent,information asymmetry,reputation information,financing order and other theories,the research topic is theoretically analyzed and the research hypothesis is proposed on this basis.Then,using the method of empirical test and analysis,this thesis discusses the correlation between annual report inquiry letter and overinvestment behavior,tests the moderating effect of information asymmetry,negative media reports,external financing dependence heterogeneity,and tests the mediating mechanism of external reputation and financing constraints.Finally,suggestions are put forward from the perspectives of regulators,listed companies,market investors and other stakeHolds.The results show that:(1)annual report inquiry can significantly reduce the scale of overinvestment,improve investment efficiency,and have a strong governance effect on overinvestment behavior;(2)The heterogeneity of corporate characteristics suggests that the lower the degree of corporate information asymmetry,the more negative the media reports,and the higher the dependence of external financing,the more significant the governance effect of annual report inquiry letter on overinvestment behavior is;(3)The intermediary mechanism of external reputation and financing constraints test results show that the annual report inquiry reduces the reputation of the receiving company,improves the Level of financing constraints,and restrains the excessive investment behavior of the receiving company.In this thesis,the annual report inquiry letter is taken as the research object to analyze the governance effect of non-penalized supervision on the over-investment behavior of listed companies,which enricifies the existing literature on the financial consequences of nonpenalized supervision,and also helps to understand the mechanism of the supervision effect of inquiry letter system.At the same time,this thesis studies the influence of non-penalized supervision on inefficient investment from the perspective of non-penalized supervision,expanding the existing literature on the influencing factors of inefficient investment behavior.In addition,this thesis examines the policy implementation effect of inquiry system from the perspective of overinvestment,which can provide useful empirical evidence for regulators and policy makers to further improve the inquiry system,and accumulate experience for listed companies to properly respond to exchange inquiries and improve investment efficiency.