Research On The Impact Of Salary Stickiness On The Innovation Of Listed Companies

Enterprises are the main promoters of innovation work.Under the current trend of "innovation-driven development",it is necessary for the times to let enterprises enhance their innovation capabilities and enhance their comprehensive strength.Due to the principal-agent problem in the enterprise and the high risk of the enterprise’s innovation activities,the executives are likely to have aversion to the enterprise’s innovation activities,which is not conducive to the development of benign and reasonable innovation investment activities of the enterprise.The executive compensation system with sticky characteristics can reflect the attitude of "heavy reward and light punishment" for executives’ innovative investment activities,which is conducive to dispelling the concerns of executives caused by the uncertainty of innovation investment activities..In addition,ordinary employees in enterprises are the main participants in innovation investment activities,and employee salary stickiness can be regarded as a fault-tolerant mechanism for employees,which can effectively stimulate employees’ creative behavior.In addition,the existence of the pay stickiness gap between executives and employees,for ordinary employees,this will arouse their competitiveness,and spontaneously improve work efficiency to obtain better compensation policies;for executives,ordinary employees constantly The sense of crisis generated by "catching up" will make it take the initiative to improve its decision-making ability,which is conducive to the further scientific and rational decision-making of enterprises’ innovation and investment.This paper selects my country’s A-share listed companies as the research object,based on innovation theory,principal-agent theory,failure tolerance theory and competition theory,to explore the impact of salary stickiness on corporate innovation.The thesis is mainly carried out from the following aspects: first,to explore the influence of executive compensation stickiness and employee compensation stickiness on enterprise innovation activities;second,to explore the moderating effect of executive and employee compensation stickiness gap on the above effects;third,to compare and analyze different property rights The differences in the above-mentioned influences and adjustment functions among enterprises under different natures;the fourth is to compare and analyze the differences in the above-mentioned influences and adjustment functions among enterprises when the industries in which the enterprises are located are different in nature.The main conclusions of this paper are:(1)Executive pay stickiness can greatly improve the level of innovation investment of enterprises,and its positive impact is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises;(2)Employee pay stickiness It can significantly improve the innovation efficiency of enterprises,and the positive impact will be more significant among non-state-owned enterprises and hightech enterprises;(3)The gap in the salary stickiness of executives will significantly increase the stickiness of executives’ compensation,which will affect the company’s innovation investment.and the moderating effect is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises;(4)the salary stickiness gap of executives will significantly improve the optimization effect of employee salary stickiness on the efficiency of enterprise innovation,and this moderating effect is in It is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises.