Research On The Executive Compensation Level And Compensation Stickiness Of State-owned Listed Companies

2016 is the beginning year of China's thirteenth five-plan.As so far,the state-owned enterprise reform has entered a deepening stage.At the moment when the national economy continue to develop,some prominent problems have not been effectively resolved,one of which is the executive salary incentive problem.With the continuous development of enterprises,the separation of shareholders and managers lead to the emergence of self-interest behavior,namely principal-agent problem.The optimal contract theory holds that effective incentives for corporate executives should solve this problem.The primary way is to establish a performance-based compensation structure system,which means that the compensation level of executives depends mainly on the performance of the enterprise.This is also the principle of "performance rise,salary rise,performance down,salary down" by which the State Council SASAC in recent years design the compensation of corporate executives.The performance-based compensation structure system is not only about that executives with good enterprise performance can be paid more,but also about how the compensation changes when there is a decline in enterprise performance.Most scholars in the past ignored this point.Is there relationship between the salary of executives and business performance? Does the executive receive a high salary because of other factors? When the company's performance declines,does the compensation of executives decline in the same proportion? If not,what factors are causing this result? What is the basis for the compensation reform of corporate executives done by both central government enterprises and local government companies in the past few years? Is it from a comprehensive consideration or just a casual reply? How to design a more reasonable salary system in the future? This article mainly discusses and studies the above problems.The combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis is adopted in this paper to study relations between the business performance and the executive compensation of state-owned listed companies,the relations between political connection and business performance,the existence of compensation stickiness,whether political connection influence compensation stickiness and the compensation incentives for executives between central government enterprises and local government companies.The full text is divided into six chapters.The first chapter is introduction.The second chapter is the literature review section.At the beginning of this part,the conceptual definition of the research object and the main variables involved are discussed.Then the research results of the previous scholars are summarized and reviewed.The third chapter is theoretical analysis,which mainly analyses some mature theory such as principal-agent theory,optimal contract theory,human capital theory,management power theory and two-factor theory to support the research and lay the theoretical foundation of this paper.The fourth chapter is the hypothesis and design part of the empirical research.This part mainly puts forward the relevant hypothesis based on the relevant theory and reality,and selects data to construct the model.The fifth chapter is the analysis of the empirical results,including correlation analysis,descriptive analysis and regression analysis to verify the proposed assumptions.The sixth chapter is the conclusion and the suggestion part.This part summarizes the empirical results and puts forward reasonable policy suggestion,and shortcomings and prospects of the research are put forward as well.There are several results in this paper:(1)There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in state-owned enterprises,but executives with political associations receive higher salaries;(2)Executives of state-owned enterprises has compensation stickiness;(3)Political connection has an enhanced effect on salary stickiness;(4)According to the nature of actual control,there is no compensation stickiness in the central government enterprises,but there is a clear salary sticky phenomenon in local government enterprises and political connection has enhanced the compensation stickiness;(5)There is a long way to go for State-owned enterprises to establish a more reasonable salary system.