Research On Management’s Opportunistic Behavior Under Stock Option Incentives

The equity incentive mechanism has been explored and developed for more than 20 years since it was introduced to China in the 1990s.It has now become the main way for my country’s listed companies to implement incentives and solve the principal-agent problem.In conversation.On the one hand,the equity incentive mechanism creates a community of interests between shareholders and management,and uses the synergy mechanism to promote the development of the company;on the other hand,the implementation of equity incentives also exposes many unreasonable links in corporate governance.At present,some scholars in my country focus on the management’s self-enrichment behavior under the appearance of stock option incentives.However,there are few case studies that deeply analyze the motivation and impact of management’s opportunistic behavior from the perspective of a single firm.Therefore,this thesis takes iFLYTEK Co.,Ltd.as a research case,uses the event research method to identify the timing behavior of iFLYTEK’s equity incentives,and studies the scheme design of iFLYTEK’s equity incentives by categories,from the selection of announcement timing to information The time point of disclosure is compared horizontally,and the various selection behaviors of iFLYTEK’s equity incentives are explained in detail,and the specific means of their selection behaviors are found.Then this thesis analyzes the motivation of management’s opportunistic behavior,and excavates the loopholes of the equity incentive system and the loopholes of the company structure from two aspects.Then this thesis analyzes the economic consequences of the selection behavior of equity incentives,summarizes the impact of the selection behavior on equity incentives,and predicts and analyzes the economic consequences that have been brought about by the selection behavior and the possible impact in the future from the perspective of small and medium shareholders,management and enterprises.The study found that HKUST belongs to other joint stock limited companies(listed)and is a non-state-owned enterprise with state participation,but its shareholding is scattered;at the same time,the composition of the company’s board of directors is unreasonable,and the proportion of independent directors is lower than the requirements of state-owned enterprises,so it is prone to insider control;Secondly,the incentive objects and the company’s directors are highly overlapped,and the remuneration and appraisal committees are not independent,which brings necessary conditions for the implementation of artificially manipulated equity incentives;at the same time,due to the nature of iFLYTEK as a state-owned enterprise,the management is affected by the salary level of the state-owned enterprise.Motivated to engage in self-interested behavior.In addition,external factors such as the lag of my country’s market supervision,incomplete information transmission in the capital market,and the influence of my country’s traditional concept of official standard have jointly caused the management’s opportunistic behavior in iFLYTEK’s equity incentives.The management is the core helm of the company’s daily operations.Equity incentives for it are not the transfer of the interests of the shareholders to the management.It should be a win-win situation for the shareholders to seek better development for the company,but this is not the case at present.Through the analysis of the economic consequences of iFLYTEK’s opportunistic behavior,this thesis also illustrates the harm of opportunistic behavior in equity incentives to external shareholders and the long-term development of the company,and puts forward suggestions based on the needs of the times.In theory,it enriches the research results on the self-seeking behavior and agency problems of the management of listed companies in equity incentives.In practice,it also provides reference for the market judgment of stakeholders,and provides suggestions for the optimization of institutional arrangements for shareholder groups,reflecting the fairness and justice of the capital market.