Research On Performance Of Holding Investment Of Private Equity Institutions Based On Double Cases

Private equity investment,originated in the United States,refers to the equity investment aimed at specific investors and raising funds in a non-public way.The main investment object is unlisted enterprises and the main purpose is to withdraw and make profits.The mainstream investment model in China is different from that in foreign countries.In the case of scattered foreign equity,private equity institutions focus on holding investment and become major shareholders by holding less equity,which has a significant impact on the decision-making and management of the invested enterprises.However,when the phenomenon of one share dominating is relatively common in China,most private equity institutions focus on equity investment.As private equity institutions hold fewer shares and have limited voice in enterprises,it is difficult to have an impact on the operation and management of enterprises and protect their own income.Therefore,in recent years,more and more private equity institutions have begun to make holding investments in invested enterprises.Previous studies have two mainstream views on the impact of private equity investment on enterprises,one is the certification supervision hypothesis,the other is the short-sighted effect hypothesis.The certification supervision fake believes that private equity institutions not only provide funds for the invested enterprises,but also use professional knowledge,rich management experience and extensive relationship network to provide value-added services for enterprises,improve their corporate governance level,improve their performance and improve the value of the invested enterprises,so as to realize high returns when they exit.The shortsighted effect hypothesis holds that the investment behavior of private equity institutions is based on arbitrage motivation,which will promote the invested enterprises that do not meet the listing conditions to list in a short time or agree on a high proportion of dividends,and even participate in the earnings management of the invested enterprises in order to obtain high returns in a short time.This behavior will damage the long-term development ability of the enterprises,Make the long-term performance of enterprises deteriorate.Starting from the perspective of certification supervision hypothesis and short-sighted effect hypothesis,this thesis selects two relatively typical cases of GTJA Investment Group holding Boya-Bio and CVC Capital holding Zhuhai Zhongfu for analysis.The study found that after holding Boya-Bio,GTJA Investment Group carried out active post investment management for the motivation of obtaining control,sharing income and building an integration platform for the medical and health industry,including improving the governance structure,implementing equity incentive,and expanding through extended M&A,which improved the long-term performance of Boya-Bio,and several M&A also received positive reactions from the market,It reflects the effect of certification supervision.CVC Capita,on the other hand,has carried out many short-term arbitrage activities driven by the private gains of control and low equity checks and balances,including fully intervening in the operation and management of Zhuhai Zhongfu,carrying out related mergers and acquisitions and obtaining high dividends,which have had a negative impact on the long-term performance and short-term market response of Zhuhai Zhongfu,Moreover,the income obtained by CVC Capital is far lower than that of GTJA Investment Group,which reflects the short-sighted effect...