The Influence Of Deleveraging On Investment Efficiency Of Excessive Debt Enterprises

After the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008,my country introduced a series of policies to stimulate economic development.These policies directly led my country to enter a period of leverage with high debt ratios,and the debt ratios of non-financial enterprises rose year after year.In 2015,in order to prevent and resolve major systemic risks,the central government proposed to carry out "supply-side structural reforms",of which "deleveraging" is of great significance.Deleveraging not only helps maintain financial stability and the smooth operation of the macro economy,but also has an important impact on the development of micro-enterprises.Investment helps to enhance corporate value and achieve corporate sustainable development goals.At present,listed companies generally have low investment efficiency.The inefficiency of enterprises has caused misplacement and waste of enterprise resources,hindering the promotion of enterprise value,and the general inefficiency will even affect the security and stability of the national economy.Whether it is possible to optimize the capital structure of enterprises and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises through deleveraging.The existing theoretical analysis basically points out the relationship between the capital structure and investment efficiency of enterprises from a static perspective,while this paper analyzes the impact of excessively indebted listed companies’ deleveraging on investment efficiency from a dynamic perspective.This is complemented by research on leverage and investment efficiency.In addition,excessive debt companies rely more on equity financing to deleverage.It is necessary to consider the impact of arbitrage risks in the market on the effect of deleveraging,and at the same time,explore the mechanism of arbitrage risk in order to better expand the effect of deleveraging.This paper firstly sorts out and reviews relevant literature research on investment efficiency,deleveraging and arbitrage risk,and conducts theoretical analysis in combination with principal-agent theory,financing constraint theory and behavioral finance theory.This paper selects the listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research object,and adopts the OLS regression research method to empirically test and analyze the impact of the "deleveraging" policy on corporate investment activities,as well as the adjustment effect of arbitrage risk on deleveraging and investment efficiency.Further analyze the adjustment mechanism of arbitrage risk from two aspects of corporate governance and investor sentiment.The empirical results show that deleveraging of excessive-debt listed companies will significantly inhibit inefficient investment.Deleveraging of excessive-debt companies can not only alleviate under-investment,but also reduce over-investment behavior to a greater extent.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the effect of deleveraging in state-owned enterprises to improve investment efficiency is stronger.While deleveraging improves investment efficiency,it can further improve corporate performance.In addition,the arbitrage risk in the securities market negatively adjusts the positive impact of deleveraging on investment efficiency,especially the arbitrage risk in the dimension of transaction costs.The adjustment effect of arbitrage risk is mainly through short-term investor sentiment weakening the effect of deleveraging on the improvement of investment efficiency.Finally,based on the research conclusions of this paper,policy recommendations are made to listed companies,investors and policy makers.