Research On The Mechanism Of Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge On The Investment Efficiency Of Listed Companies

With the continuous deepening of China’s capital market,especially the emerging financing method of equity pledge,in the process of share structure reform,the convenient financing method of controlling shareholder equity pledge has attracted more and more attention.Equity pledge has many characteristices and uncomplicated operation,high speed and inexpensive,but the potential risks are not low.The equity pledge by the major shareholder will not only affect the major shareholder itself,however it affects the way of the listed company opearte.The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge financing may bring about the separation of the two rights,so the acting collision between the holding shareholder and minority shareholders will also enhance,which may ultimately affect the decisions of the big shareholder for listed company.In the first place,this study generalizes and analyzes the corresponding document on equity pledge,enterprise investment efficiency and financing restrictions.Combining principal-agent theory,priority financing view,Private Interest view of Control and Asymmetric Information statement,it puts forward that the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge should be used to invest in listed companies.The presumptions that efficiency has a passive influence,and the hypothesis that financing constraints play an intermediary role in the major shareholder’s equity pledge and the underinvestment of listed companies,and the moderating role of management’s shareholding.Secondly,this paper picks China’s listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between2013 and 2020 as a specimen,uses empirical modus to carry out an emperienced analysis on the equity pledge of major shareholders and the investment efficiency of listed companies,and carry out heterogeneity analysis according to the nature of property rights and regions.Finally,the following research conclusions are drawn:(1)The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge may be obviously totally related with the invalid investment of listed companies,and is also significantly positively correlated with overinvestment and under-investment.At the same time,Discover for SOEs,the connection between controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and investment efficiency is not in evidence,but it is greater in private enterprise.Given the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on underinvestment,listed companies in the eastern region are more significant;(2)management’s shareholding has a alleviate influence on the nexus between dominate shareholder’s stock pledge and inefficient investment in listed companies,and management’s shareholding will fall off passive affect of dominate shareholder’s stock pledge on investment promptness;(3)Financing constraints play a partial intermediary effect in the process of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge leading to insufficient investment in listed companies.Underinvestment played a partial intermediary role.This paper focuses on the intermediary effect of financing constraints in the path of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge affecting investment efficiency,and introduces management’s shareholding to analyze the moderating effect,which enriches the effect of major shareholders’ stock pledge on investment efficiency of listed companies.Research.