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Research On The Impact Of Non-family Shareholder Governance On The Allocation Of Financial Assets Of Family Enterprises

Posted on:2023-08-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S J LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306833978259Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
China’s economy has grown at a high speed since the reform and opening up.The financial market has also developed rapidly.And the problem of funds leaving the real economy and "idling" in the financial market has gradually emerged,how to guide financial development back to the track of serving the real economy,for the long-term and stable development of China’s economy,is of great significance that cannot be ignored.The "Decision" of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed that China should actively develop a mixed-ownership economy at a new starting point in the new historical development stage,and family enterprises,as an important branch of the private economy,should also actively introduce heterogeneous non-family shareholders.Through the research on the data of family enterprises in China from 2008 to 2020,this paper focuses on whether the entry of non-family shareholders can lead the financial assets allocation to return to the track of serving the real economy,that is,to study the effect of non-family shareholders governance on the financial assets allocation of family enterprises.Empirical analyses through descriptive statistics and other steps show that non-family shareholders governance can promote family enterprises to make financial assets allocation decisions,but also inhibit the proportion of family enterprises allocating financial assets.Further research finds that the financial assets allocation decision of family enterprises promoted by non-family shareholders governance is mainly motivated by profit-seeking motives,at the same time,the proportion of financial assets allocation of family enterprises inhibited by non-family shareholder governance is motivated by profit-seeking motives and preventive motives,that is,non-family shareholders’ entry inhibits the financial assets allocated by family firms for profit motives and preventive motives.In addition,this paper also finds that for family enterprises with different levels of financial assets allocation,different types of financial assets,non-family shareholders of different nature,different institutional efficiency regions,different ways of familialization,the influence of non-family shareholders governance on the financial assets allocation of family enterprises has a certain degree of difference.It is hoped that the research of this paper can provide new ideas for improving the corporate governance level of family enterprises and guiding financial development to return to the track of serving the real economy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Governance of non-family shareholders, Family enterprises, Allocation of financial assets
PDF Full Text Request
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