Research On Enterprise’s R&D Decision Bias Of Complementary Innovation Projects

With economic globalization and the development of science and technology,the trend of industrial globalization is becoming more and more significant.The complementary innovation research and development is becoming more and more common around the world.Moreover,in the complementary innovation market,there are often technological monopolies with high technical barriers,which have monopolistic discourse power in the complementary innovation market and occupy an absolute position in the distribution of market profits.Therefore,this paper focuses on complementary innovation projects and discusses the structure of R&D investment in complementary innovation projects.Based on the research of Choi&Gerlach(2014),this paper discusses the problem of corporate R&D decision-making when there are limited and infinite companies participating in the R&D of two complementary innovation projects in the market.Meanwhile,it innovatively considers the influence of asymmetric patent market structure and asymmetric income on individual R&D decisionmaking of enterprises.While deducing the model,this paper visually presents the research results with the help of Matlab,and finally draws the following conclusions:(1)Under the condition that only one enterprise can obtain the patent for each complementary innovation project,in the static R&D project selection model of infinite enterprises,the market equally shares the R&D resources.In the dynamic R&D project selection model of infinite enterprises,enterprises are more inclined to participate in the R&D of relatively easier projects.(2)In the case that only one enterprise can obtain the patent for each complementary innovation project and there are two R&D stages,the R&D bias of enterprises towards complementary innovation projects is not constant.When there are infinite enterprises participating in the R&D competition in the market,or the number of enterprises is equal to the number of complementary innovation projects,enterprises are more inclined to engage in relatively simple technological projects in the first stage of R&D.When R&D resources are limited in the market and the number of enterprises is more than the number of complementary innovation projects,enterprises are more inclined to engage in the R&D of relatively difficult technology projects in the first stage.(3)When the number of enterprises is more than the number of complementary innovation projects,and there are limited enterprises with only one R&D stage competing the complementary innovation R&D,compared with the symmetric patent market structure,the excess market profits under the asymmetric patent market structure will encourage enterprises to invest more R&D resources into more difficult technology projects.(4)When the number of enterprises is more than the number of complementary innovation projects,and the complementary innovation R&D of limited enterprises has two R&D stages,enterprises tend to invest more R&D resources in more difficult technology projects,and the asymmetric market profit distribution brought by the asymmetric patent market structure will further encourage enterprises to engage in the research and development of more difficult technology projects.And when the excess market profit effect and the competition effect work at the same time,the influence on R&D decision-making is the most significant.This paper focuses on complementary innovative products and discusses the influence of different market structure and patent structure on R&D investment decision.The research in this paper enriches the research system in the field of complementary innovation in a certain sense,and plays a guiding role in enterprises’ innovation R&D decision-making.Moreover,the government can also encourage enterprises to participate in the complementary innovation R&D in a more targeted way.